Musharaff’s Kashmir Proposals Deserve a Constructive Response
By: | Dr. Syed M. Inayatullah Andrabi | Date: | November 02, 2004 |
Convenor- Mahazi-Islami |
President General Parvez Musharaff’s recent proposals on Kashmir spelt out on an Iftar reception on 25th October, 04 in Islamabad are highly important. Their real significance and productive value needs to be grasped by all those who have a sincere and genuine commitment to the Kashmir Cause. In the following lines I will try to, first, put these proposals in perspective, and second, argue for a proper response.
Perspective: First and foremost, these proposals should be viewed as what they really are. They are not statements of policy, they are practical suggestions for a solution. As such, words such as ‘climb down’ or ‘sell out’ simply do not apply to them. Let us explain this point by referring to a context, a general, and a specific context.
As far as the general context is concerned, we must very clearly differentiate between a stand or a position and the practical step of solving a problem. States hold positions on different issues, and so has been Pakistan holding about Kashmir. Stands do not represent mutual compromises between the parties involved in an issue on which the stand is taken; they are an expression of convictions and beliefs of a state resulting from its unique outlook and the perception of reality. As such taking a stand on an issue is a unilateral exercise; solving it, however, is not. Solution necessarily requires an agreement between the concerned parties. That is the civilized way, and definitely the Prophetic way. Imposed solutions, on the other hand, have been the way of Jahiliyah (ignorance). Arrogant powers, like USA in this day and age, impose solutions for their selfcreated problems only to establish their hegemony and dominance over others. President Musharaff’s talk of Kashmir options, when viewed in this context, makes perfect sense. Plebiscite, it should be noted, is not part of the Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir; it has been and still is for most of the supporters of Kashmir cause and for Pakistan as well, a preferred tool and a practical mechanism for the solution of this issue. It is not part of our conviction on what is the dispute of Kashmir; the core of that conviction is that India’s presence in and sovereignty over Kashmir is completely illegitimate, and must be ended. Since it is not a matter of belief or conviction where the value is intrinsic, we have to look for the value of plebiscite in its capacity to deliver the results, its ability to unlock the issue and set the things going. If it fails in that, it gets devalued, I am afraid. So, in a talk of solution, if President Musharaff is telling India that let us solve it this way, that way, without committing himself to any of the ways, he is simply initiating and galvanising a process. When we come to the level of solving a problem, not just one or two, we can talk of N number of solutions in order to motivate and engage the opponent. At the end we may and should commit ourselves only to the best solution.
There is a specific context as well to President Musharaff’s options talk. One should recall what the president has been saying right from his Agra visit to India. He suggested a multistage operational process for the solution of Kashmir issue, in which at the first stage, India and Pakistan should start talking to each other with Kashmir as the main issue; at second all options not acceptable to concerned parties should be ruled out; and finally at third, the options left after exclusion should be discussed and a solution worked out. Viewed in this context, it would seem that we have entered second stage of the process: two main ‘options’ conversion of LOC into international border, and plebiscite have been excluded because of their not being acceptable to Pakistan and India respectively, and the stage is set for discussing a number of options, including those mentioned by President Musharaff. But did we reach here without going through stage one, and, more importantly, are we talking here about an individual’s i.e. President Musharaff’s journey of imagination, a one-way traffic where proposals are floated by Pakistan only with India remaining unmoved, or the real movement of Kashmir cause where all the concerned parties are moving and converging towards a just solution? These are very important questions, and one has to have a very clear idea of what the reality is, because that only will determine how one appreciates Musharaff’s proposals and the very act of articulating these, and, subsequently, how one responds to these. Now let us take the first part of question, namely, the bypassing of stage one. Here the answer is no, we have not bypassed; the stage one has been properly covered. It was in Agra in 2001 that India and Pakistan, both, went through this stage. The core message that emanated from Agra happenings was that India and Pakistan can talk to each other well, but if Kashmir is left out the communication will break down, and although there are so many other things also to be discussed, yet leaving out Kashmir will effectively mean no talk on Kashmir and no talk on any thing else as well. Subsequent developments, confirmed this message: since India refused to talk about Kashmir, Indo-Pak dialogue broke down, and tension gripped the region with India mobilising its troops on Pakistan’s border. After this truth was firmly established at the first stage, India and Pakistan started moving to the second with this year’s Vajpayee’s visit to Pakistan on the eve of SAARC summit. The joint statement issued at the end of Vajpayee-Musharaff meeting mentioned about the solution of Kashmir issue and the satisfaction of the parties concerned (they meant India and Pakistan only, but that is not the point here). As a corollary to the satisfaction factor, LOC and plebiscite options are being ruled out now.
Coming to the second, and undoubtedly the more important part of the question, namely, President Musharaff’s utterances being a one way traffic or not, the answer is again no, they are not a one way traffic; there is a very subtle but meaningful movement on the part of India too, but this movement has its unique characteristics, and one may have to use a different yardstick to measure this movement. For example, one should not only look for what India says, but should rather keep watching what India listens to and does not reject. This is conventional Kashmiri wisdom, according to which the silence of an adult person amounts to yes. There is an understandable reason why such a yardstick should be employed. Let us for a moment travel back in time and take a view of Muslim politics in and before 1947. Pakistan emerged after the idea of a unified Muslim political entity in post-colonial south Asia became an achievable political objective. It caught the imagination of Muslims from north to south, east to west. Muslims in Madras (which was geographically so remote from the would-be Pakistan) worked for it, and so did the Muslims in Assam. The referendums in Sylhet and North West Frontier Province returned a vote of victory to Pakistan. As was very much expected post-Dogra Kashmir would have followed the suit, but history took a different turn. Why and how, is not our topic here, the point I wish to make is that in this historical scenario, Pakistan stands as a deprived party (deprived of something it could have got), India as a successful grabber. Now, as common sense goes, shouting always comes from the deprived party; grabber prefers total silence, because that alone guarantees his control over the grabbed entity. So indeed there has not been much shouting from India, but meaningful signals there have been. When we start looking at these, the most significant indication that we find in recent times about India’s intention to solve the Kashmir problem, is in former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s musings (his two part article published in early January, 2001), wherein he counted Kashmir as one of the India’s main legacy problems. Characterizing it as the “long-standing problem with Pakistan”, and “an unfortunate inheritance from the tragic partition of India in 1947”, Vajpayee categorically stated that “India is willing and ready to seek a lasting solution to the Kashmir problem”. It is noteworthy here, that Vajpayee did not talk of Kashmir as a law and order problem, but as a political one with its roots in the political re-organisational history of south Asia. One should also note that this and subsequent moves by BJP to address Kashmir issue enjoyed the support of India’s political parties across the board. Vajpayee-Musharaff talks on the eve of SAARC summit early this year initiating a ‘peaceprocess’, the subsequent Indo-Pak meetings as part of the process, and a powerful reiteration by the newly formed government in India to take the process forward are all meaningful steps showing India’s movement along the path of the resolution of Kashmir issue. Last but not least, let us invoke the earlier mentioned Kashmiri wisdom, and see what was India’s official reaction to President Musharaff’s options talk. None of the essentials of options talk were rejected. The President had said that options on Kashmir was the subject of discussion between him and Dr Manmohan Singh at New York, and Indian foreign office did not refute that. However, the most important of it all, was India’s silence on President Musharaff’s rejection of LOC as a solution of Kashmir problem. I have been closely watching India’s diplomatic activism on Kashmir in world capitals like Washington and London, and know very well that conversion of LOC into international border is the solution that India has been trying very hard to mobilize support for, and had succeeded to a large extent. If one can recall, in early nineties India’s Congress government under PV Narsimah Rao had a resolution passed in the joint house of the Indian parliament saying the whole Kashmir is India’s integral part. Triggered by a different context then, this resolution too had actually the same purpose: to create a maxima list position by laying claim on the whole territory, so that when LOC is converted to international border, India would seem to have conceded something to Pakistan, and the solution would look a normal give and take solution.
Response: We have looked at General Parvez Musharaff proposals in perspective. The purpose is that instead of making customary criticisms like ‘Musharaff has unveiled American plan’ etc. etc. we should grasp the basic message that the debate about Kashmir’s political future has been declared open. It was never closed, but now it has been opened as part of the process. If we want to matter in history we must participate vigorously in the debate. The greatest source for deriving satisfaction in President’s utterances is the outright rejection of LOC as a solution. This could have been a possible sell-out, and the worst I can think of. As mentioned above India had been seriously working for it, and if it could show it works on the ground, the so-called international community would have supported it. However, whatever the other parameters, Kashmiri people need to develop a solid viewpoint about their political destiny through a healthy debate and discussion. Let me say a few things relating to the quality and character of this debate:
1) The most important thing to note is that when we are talking of the political destiny of Kashmir, we are talking of something that is going to affect generations to come. As such, all those who express themselves on this issue—and most political groups do—–must do so with a great sense of responsibility, and accountability, both, before the people and in the ultimate court of Allah (SWT).
2) When there is a common sense of destiny, shared aims and objectives, the different and diverse viewpoints definitely find a point of convergence, and it is precisely that point which represents the collective wisdom, and strategic vision of a community. The common objectives to which all the debate and discussion should remain subservient, include among other things, a permanent resolution of the Kashmir conflict, indeed the most important objective.
3) Those coming up with different solutions should substantiate their viewpoint by recourse to rational argument as opposed to emotionalism or romanticism. They should be able to make a very clear and understandable case of how their proposals can achieve the common objectives, in other words, how these proposals can lead to a permanent resolution of the conflict.
4) Last but not least, an informed debate should take place, one that breaks the myths, not perpetuates them. For example, it is often said there will be no compromise on ‘riyasat ki wahdat’ i.e. the unity of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, meaning thereby that the division of the princely state as it existed in 1947 will not be allowed. The truth is that such a state of Jammu and Kashmir (the division of which will not be tolerated) never existed on earth; what existed instead is the Dogra Empire which is incorrectly referred to as the state of Jammu and Kashmir. It is important to distinguish between a state and an empire. Empires are the fiefdoms of monarchs; as such they stretch over regions, countries and diverse communities. There were empires in Europe, and other parts of the world. Closer to home, there was a huge British Indian empire. In addition to present day India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, this empire contained, within it, countries like Sri Lanka and Burma. Empires represent geographical regions, and not well knit states, where the people are held together by some principle of solidarity. It was exactly along these lines that the great visionary Allama Iqbal argued with the Congress led by Gandhi, saying that the British Indian empire was not a state or country called India, it was a land of diverse communities “intensely jealous” of their collective existence and these communities, Allama believed had “a right to free development” according to their own “cultural traditions”( 1930 Allahabad address). In their insistence on unitary visions of Indian ‘nation’, confusing British Indian empire with Indian nation-state, Allama very clearly saw through the Indian Nationalists’ game “to secure permanent communal dominance in the whole of India.” (1930 Allahabad address)
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Dr. Syed M Inayatullah Andrabi is a well-known figure in the circles of political Islam. Born in Srinagar, the capital city of Indian Held Kashmir, Dr Andrabi has been intimately involved at the intellectual level with the global politics and political issues since his student days in 1980 at Pune (India), where he completed his Ph.D. in Linguistics in 1983 at the Centre of Advanced Study in Linguistics, Deccan College, University of Pune, Pune, India. Upon completing his doctorate he returned home to join the University of Kashmir, first on a post-doctoral fellowship and later as faculty, but could not continue because of the deteriorating security situation in Kashmir, and had to move to United Kingdom in 1994 where he continues to live since along with his wife and five children.