A Case for Holding World Conference on Kashmir

A: Why Conference? ——the reasons

1) Kashmir has been in the news for almost a decade now. The present uprising that started in 1989, is not the first expression of Kashmiri peoples’ anger against India; there have been anti-India movements—secret and open both—–all along since 1947. However, the present mov’t being characterized by the radical method of popular militancy, did create a big bang effect, both, in and outside Kashmir. In Kashmir it gave a fresh hope to the masses and a boost to their imagination, and among the Muslims outside, it created excitement, sympathy and enthusiasm. The organized sections within the Ummah—political and other parties swung into action, organising conferences, mostly called Jehad conferences, mobilising good will and support for the movement in Kashmir. All this focussed on the ongoing mov’t. remaining confined to the description of the present situation, that also in terms of day to day events. One can safely make some general points regarding all this Kashmir related activism:

• Being organized by political/religious parties, partisan interests remained the over-riding consideration in almost all the conferences and other such popular events. Extending the social base of the party, and mobilising funds, have been the predominant objectives, these conferences have, by and large, sought to achieve.
  
• As regards education and awareness, these conferences proved almost mute, and sometimes even misleading, since the picture of Kashmir situation and movement that these parties projected, was according to their party preferences.
  
• All these conferences have been popular events, aiming at drawing huge crowds and restricted to fiery speeches. Intellectual debate and argument has been missing. In spite of so much Kashmir related political activism, the fact remains that the serious issues involved in the Kashmir conflict, have not been brought up, discussed, deliberated and analyzed so far.

Unfortunately, Kashmir’s occupation by India, or for that matter India’s wider role in the region after 1947, has not received due intellectual attention in the Muslim world. Till the demise of Soviet Union, Kashmir issue was considered a function of ‘cold-war’. Pakistan’s participation in American military alliances, CENTO and SEATO also had an effect: Pakistan being seen as US client, its claim on Kashmir deprived this cause of the wider respectability it otherwise deserved. India’s democracy and secularism also added to the confusion: with a ‘popular’ local government and ‘elected’ assembly in place and all essential ‘human freedoms’ granted, why should Kashmiri population revolt against Indian rule? Some well-meaning circles even reasoned this way: why should Kashmir rise up against India, after all by joining Pakistan they are moving from one slavery (that of India) to another (that of America, through Pakistan). In this confusing configuration of historical ‘facts’—–India being democratic, secular, non-aligned and against imperialism, Pakistan a US stooge, and Kashmir a normal and routine affair for India——the basic truth about Kashmir was somehow ignored: Kashmir is a Muslim land with an exceptionally important geo-strategic location, a rich Islamic culture and heritage, and in the past has formed an integral part of Muslim heartland of Central Asia, Srinagar having been one of the milestones on the Silk route. A precious physical asset of Islam, as Kashmir is, being lost in the sea of infidels and polytheists, should have been the matter of great and serious concern for all right thinking Muslims. That it has not been, is a typical case of facts camouflaging the truth. Now fortunately, the above mentioned confusing configuration of ‘facts’, has ceased to be: Kashmir is up in arms against India; the latter is fast emerging with its original violent Hindu identity, and although not much has changed in case of Pakistan, yet India openly and zealously siding with US and Israel in their mission to fight Islam, is, contributing to an important change, namely, an anti-American identity is getting imposed on Pakistan, and regionally the focus of anti-Americanism is shifting from India to Pakistan. All this has worked out well in favour of Kashmir issue. When one talks of Islamic political agenda, or West-Islam confrontation, Kashmir figures prominently in the debate. A necessary threshold has been reached, where we need to focus on the issues instead of mere events (Indian excesses or the heroic acts of mujahideen) in a non-partisan, non-popular, rational way. The whole gamut of issues, with all their dimensions—historical, security-strategic, civilizational—- underlying the Kashmir problem, should now be subjected to a rational debate, with an aim of developing a vision for future. The fact that Kashmir problem is integrally linked to the recent sub-continental political history, cannot be over emphasized, it is therefore, natural that while discussing Kashmir we are essentially subjecting the whole ideological baggage—Indian nationalism, two-nation theory, etc.etc.—- to intellectual scrutiny, and this is long overdue. There must be some truth in what Nehru in a letter to Shiekh Abdullah on 3 Dec, 1947 wrote: ‘Kashmir has become a symbol of the basic conflict in India. On the decision of Kashmir, one might almost say, depends not only the future of Kashmir, but the future of Pakistan and to a considerable extent the future of India’(MJ Akbar ‘Nehru—The Making of India’ p449). The last ten years of activism in and outside Kashmir has brought us to a point where there is lot of noise but too little meaning, what is now needed most is to interpret and make sense of this noise. This can be achieved by a conference: understanding the Kashmir movement and the situation in terms of issues.

2) Struggles are normally illustrative of the set objectives. But it all depends on the quality of the movement—-its leadership, clarity of ideas, sources of financial support. Sometimes the real objectives for which the movement was initiated in the first place, get lost in the course of struggle, and even replaced by a totally different set of objectives. It is always for those who do not have an exclusive or vested interest, to clarify the real objectives. As regards the objectives of the present movement in Kashmir, ever newer things are cropping up. As the so- called internationalisation of Kashmir continues, more and more interests, mostly inimical to Islam and Muslims, are getting into this imbroglio, and the domain of new proposals and solutions goes on extending. A non-partisan, rational view of the whole matter can establish the criteria—-moral, ideological and strategic—-which can legitimize the objectives. These objectives and the logic underpinning them need to be clearly stated, which can be done through a conference.

3) As the Kashmir movement has been on for the past ten years now, so many new things have come to the fore. We can look at it as a historical experience of a people, of a section of the Muslim ummah. There may not be altogether any new realities to have come into being—-Indo-US nexus, for example, is not a new reality—- but there may be significant cases of hidden realities prominently surfacing during the course of this struggle. An important reason, why a conference on Kashmir should be held is, this is the ripe time for a review. A thorough evaluation of the presumptions and strategies and policies needs to be made according to how much successful and productive they have practically proven. The lessons need to be carefully identified and crystallized, and on that basis new avenues of thought and action need to be spelt out.

4) Although a movt against Indian occupation exists in Kashmir—it has existed before and will in future with or without outside support—-but for the actual event of Kashmir’s liberation to happen, three ingredients of success are required, namely a) a resistance movt in Kashmir, b) a strong Pakistan—one that will consider Kashmir as its own number one issue, and will be prepared to face an India-imposed war, if matters go to that extent, in the course of reclaiming Kashmir, and c) a politically reorganized India. Out of these three, the first two are essential, whereas the last one will facilitate the process. The conference can develop some ideas as to how we can work towards getting these ingredients in place.

B: What to be discussed?—–the themes

The Conference should aim at breaking a fresh ground in the overall thinking on Kashmir—-the issue, the solution, and the methods. Following themes can, therefore, be selected for deliberation at the conference.

1) Kashmir Issue: What is Kashmir issue? A lot of confusion surrounds this basic question. Quite often, we come across the statements that Kashmir problem is not a border dispute between two states, it is the question of the basic right of self-determination of seventeen million Kashmiri people. This statement typifies the confusion: ideological considerations apart for a moment (where we can talk in terms of secular/Islamic), merely on the basis of historical facts, this characterization of Kashmir problem is absolutely untrue. A simple inquiry into the recent history will reveal the fact that there are ‘Kashmir issues’ instead of a Kashmir Issue. Using the terms for the sake of convenience here, we can say that there is a Kashmiris’ Kashmir Issue (KKI), and Pakistan’s Kashmir issue (PKI). KKI, the way it has been expressed historically, is again a heterogeneous concept. During early 1930s, before late Shiekh Abdullah’s emergence on the Kashmiri political scene, KKI simply represented a case of Muslim resentment against the tyrannical non-Muslim Dogra rule; Kashmiri nationalism, cultural or territorial, did not form the basis of KKI at that time. With Shiekh’s emergence in late thirties KKI came to mean Kashmiri resistance against non-Kashmiri rule; cultural nationalism did form the basis here. The events of 1947 ‘imposed’ a new agenda for the ongoing Kashmir movt, and KKI which hitherto was essentially about transfer of power (from non-Muslim/Dogra to Muslim/Kashmiri), now came to have different reference: it referred to right of self-determination of Kashmiri people, and their choice regarding alignment with either India or Pakistan. What is important to note is, that in its newly acquired sense, Kashmir issue was not so much a problem of Kashmiri people, as it was of the newly emerged domains, India and Pakistan. It was a matter of crucial and vital interest to them, and as such was their problem. These domains had to ensure their proper physical constitution according to the rules on the basis of which they had emerged in the first place. That it was a matter of urgent interest to these domains is borne out by the fact that India used military power to annex Hyderabad and Junagarh, without waiting for the laid down process to take its own course. Now this brings us to a point where one can understand what is Pakistan’s Kashmir Issue’(PKI), as we called it above. Kashmir issue in its post-47 meaning no doubt involves Kashmiri people but it is basically Pakistan’s problem: through a well-conceived and executed plan, Pakistan has been deprived of a vital constituent part of it i.e. Kashmir, both, by fraud as well as by force; PKI therefore is a much serious issue.

The differentiation of Kashmir issue into KKI and PKI above, is not for academic purposes; it is directly related and very much relevant to the solution of the Kashmir conflict, and accordingly, to the method used to bring about that solution. In fact the right understanding of the Kashmir problem needs to take this differentiation into account. Keeping this differentiation in view, it is not difficult to appreciate that over the past so many years, the way Kashmir problem has been presented and sought to be solved, it is the KKI that has come to be regarded as the issue at the cost of PKI. Kashmir issue has come to refer to a problem’ a small population in a remote corner of the world is facing. There can be more than one projections of what the problem is: the denial of the right of self determination; the erosion of the distinct identity ‘kashmiriyat’ of Kashmiris by the Indian rule; alienation of people from India because of misrule or atrocities etc etc.—KKI has meant all these things at various points in time right from early 30s—- , but the common denominator here is that it is a local problem faced by Kashmiris. Now, up till 47 this could be true, wholly or partly, but after that it is neither wholly nor partly true, it is absolutely untrue: Kashmir issue is not essentially a problem of a local people; they are no doubt its first victims, but as a racial/cultural community they are incidental to the real problem, which is basically the Brahmin led Hindu determination to defeat the emergence and consolidation of Muslim political power in the post-British subcontinent, and ensure their own political/cultural hegemony. Islam, therefore, is central to the whole affair here. If India has grabbed Kashmir, and is not allowing a referendum there, it is not because of Kashmiris being a particular racial/cultural group, but in fighting Islam it considers it necessary. Kashmir issue, therefore, represents and symbolizes the basic conflict in post-British south Asia, namely the conflict between Islam and Brahmin led Hinduism (a local hostile environment of Islam that has not been adequately researched, analyzed and described). Here the Kashmiri Muslims are as much a party in this conflict as are other Muslims, and as is Pakistan. Hence KKI, as we called it above, should ideally mean the same thing now as what we called PKI, but KKI, the way it has historically manifested itself, particularly before 1947, gives a room to the forces hostile to Islam and Muslims, to reduce Kashmir problem to a local dispute. One must note here that this is the standard practice of the enemies of Islam, they did the same thing to Palestine: reduced it to a local problem faced by Palestinian people with Al-Quds a local village shrine and Yasser Arafat an aspirant for its sajada nishini. It is significant to note that during the present Kashmir movt, there have been deliberate attempts, both, in and outside Kashmir, to project Kashmir issue as exclusively KKI. Now, as we said above this has implication for the solution of this Issue and the methods needed: if Kashmir issue is exclusively KKI, then there can be so many solutions, for example internal autonomy, which can satisfy peoples quest for a distinct identity, or their demand of self-governance. Such solutions may not call for an armed movt or a bloody struggle; these can be achieved through a dialogue. Now, as one can see, this is extremely detrimental to the Kashmir cause. Kashmir issue needs to be understood and projected, not exclusively, but mainly as PKI. This alone restores the issue its real substance and character. If the state of Pakistan does not realize this—Kashmir being primarily Pakistan’s issue—that does not mean it is not; that only confirms the view that the ruling elites there are, and have been, unaware of the logic of Pakistan: they just got a country to rule and a powerful ideology, Islam, to use as opposed to follow.

Ideologically speaking, Kashmir issue is neither Pakistan’s (PKI) nor Kashmiris’ issue (KKI), it is essentially Islam’s issue, but going by historical developments (considering that Pakistan, in theory at least, emerged as the physical anchor for Islam in the post-British South Asia), there is no doubt that Kashmir is and should have been from day one, the most vital issue for Pakistan, related as it was to its very being. For the erstwhile princely states like Kashmir, accession to India or Pakistan was not an immediate concern; it was rather an aspiration( Kashmiris, for example, aspiring to join Pakistan) but for the emerged domains(India & Pakistan) it was a matter of most urgent necessity for the reason that on this depended their emergence as complete and whole entities.

2) Pakistan’s role in the genesis of Kashmir conflict and later in its resolution needs to be brought into sharp focus. A comprehensive debate is required to critically examine Pakistan’s Kashmir policy right from the beginning. This should be done with a forward looking and constructive perspective—to make Pakistan’s Kashmir involvement more effective and productive in future. India started as a naked aggressor in Kashmir in 1947; later in UN Security Council resolution of 1949, India was virtually treated as such. However, with the passage of time it improved, its standing in Kashmir to the extent that the world outside considered its presence in Kashmir as almost legitimate. For the past ten years now, India has killed hundreds of thousands of Kashmiri youth, all in the name of restoring normalcy and fighting foreign i.e. Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. By and large the world outside has accepted India’s position in its basics: India has been asked to exercise restraint in the name of human rights, and Pakistan to stop interference. Now this tells the whole story: India is like a household chief in Kashmir responsible for maintaining order, and Pakistan an outsider and intruder.

Why this should be so? Why Pakistan’s involvement is interference in a territory which is rightfully a constituent part of it, and what on the earth legitimizes India presence there, not to speak of the reign of terror and oppression it has so ruthlessly unleashed ? Apart from practical mistakes, a critical examination may reveal theoretical flaws in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. Pakistan has got hugely involved in Kashmir for the past ten years, but it bases the case of its involvement on very fragile foundations, namely, providing moral and diplomatic support to Kashmiris in their struggle to achieve the right of self-determination. Thus among so many international commitments around the world, and supporting so many other causes, Pakistan is supporting a noble cause in Kashmir as well. This creates a lot of problems for Pakistan: it has to sustain so many unsustainable positions, for example, the position that Pakistan is only providing moral and diplomatic support to the Mujahideen in Kashmir. It also adversely affects the authenticity and credibility of Pakistan’s Kashmir case; it robs it of all its moral bonafides. Furthermore it adds yet one more stale and useless theme to the already stagnant political discourse in Pakistan, namely, what is first, Pakistan’s security and defense or Kashmir’s freedom? Above all, building the case this way seriously limits Pakistan’s options and level of its involvement in Kashmir. Its support to Kashmir movement invites hostility from its nieghbour, India, creating a conflict, and it has to take care to balance its level of support to Kashmir with the level of conflict with India. This neither benefits Pakistan nor Kashmir; it harms both.

On the other hand, apart from its de facto possession of Kashmir through armed aggression, India has no foundations for a credible case for its involvement in Kashmir. Yet India has built up a strong case for its involvement saying Kashmir is its integral part ‘atoot ang’. Corresponding to this, India’s practical involvement in Kashmir is simply huge: there are hundreds of thousands of Indian armed forces killing and maiming Kashmiri Muslims; in Kargil recently India launched an extremely high-cost operation, though miserably unsuccessful; every Indian leader worth his salt landed at Kargil. When Pakistan goes to world capitals telling them there is a freedom movement in Kashmir, India dismisses the whole case by a single phrase ‘Pakistan’s interference’, and then Pakistan pleads innocence saying it is only providing moral and diplomatic support. This way it becomes an extremely unequal contest: Pakistan in a self-imposed weak position with India with a very strong case though without any foundation. Pakistan should get rid of its self-imposed weakness. It should straightway question the very legitimacy of India’s presence in Kashmir. It was left to United Nations Security Council resolutions to decide who should vacate from Kashmir, India or Pakistan, the present movement in Kashmir has demonstrated beyond doubt that it is India who has to vacate.

One can argue, that Pakistan may have some strategic considerations behind its present Kashmir policy. By remaining in the supportive role, it wants a movement of self-determination to grow in Kashmir that would seek to gain international recognition and support, which will ultimately result in world powers exerting pressure on India to resolve the dispute, as Indonesia was pressurized to allow a referendum in East Timor. How far things have worked out this way, one can evaluate now. Advantages, if any, are there to be explored, but the disadvantages of this approach are evident. The greatest disadvantage is that by assuming the role of a mere supporter, Pakistan effectively surrenders its rightful claim on what is due to it, thereby conceding defeat before India. It seems that when its leaders loudly complained of ‘moth-eaten and truncated Pakistan’ in 1947, that was not a protest with a will to get the wrongs undone; that was a simple acceptance of the reality. This raises questions about Pakistan’s seriousness in Kashmir cause. There are well meaning individuals who do not take Pakistan’s advocacy of Kashmir cause very seriously, they say that when it comes to crunch Pakistan will buckle. Same applies internationally: Pakistan often complains that in its confrontation with India over Kashmir, it does not get the support of other nations. Other reasons apart, one reason can be that Pakistan does not show, by word and deed, how serious it is with regard to Kashmir. After all India matches its word of ‘atoot ang’ with the deed of ‘going to any extent’, and then other nations, realizing how serious India is in this matter, support it. This is precisely, what India wanted to demonstrate through its recent response to Kargil crisis: it made it clear to the whole world that it is prepared to go to any extent while ‘defending its integral part’.

3) The strategic realities of the region need to be thoroughly analyzed and their implication for the Kashmir solution need to be properly deliberated at the Conference. Indo-US relation is one of the most significant strategic reality of the region. This is not essentially a new one—-India has always been regarded by the West as its favourite counterweight against China—–but in the changing circumstances this reality is emerging very prominently, particularly after the Kargil episode. This reality needs to be examined from close and its implication for Islam in South-Central Asia in the short, medium and long-term need to be worked out in detail. Being important in its own right, it becomes more important in view of the fact that the present Kashmir movement in and outside Kashmir looks too much towards the West, trying to ultimately seek its mediation in the dispute. Let us briefly note some points about this relation here:

The so-called fundamentalism and the ‘Taliban phenomenon’ are two factors where a sort of coalition of interest is emerging between US and India. India is being encouraged to take up a wider role to participate in multinational efforts to combat ‘Islamic terrorism’. Jaswant Singh, the Indian Foreign Minister, visited some central Asian capitals in this regard, and US top official dealing with counter terrorism visited New Delhi. US is keen to get India, once again, involved in Afghan affairs. The huge US investment in India, and India’s growing powerful business lobby in US, is becoming yet one more factor of collusion between the two.

The factors of collusion apart, a conflict of interest seems imminent between US and India in the long term. This will mainly stem from India’s power ambition. India’s nuclear explosions early in May 98, and the announcement of its nuclear doctrine recently, has made it very clear what India is up to. Planning to build up a blue water navy with nuclear war heads, India is dreaming of controlling the Indian Ocean. The power projection, India has made through its nuclear doctrine, gives enough reason for US strategists to see India as a military rival in the long run. There is ample evidence that US does see India as such, and they foresee a conflict of interest arising out of India’s huge power build up.

The factors of collusion apart, a conflict of interest seems imminent between US and India in the long term. This will mainly stem from India’s power ambition. India’s nuclear explosions early in May 98, and the announcement of its nuclear doctrine recently, has made it very clear what India is up to. Planning to build up a blue water navy with nuclear war heads, India is dreaming of controlling the Indian Ocean. The power projection, India has made through its nuclear doctrine, gives enough reason for US strategists to see India as a military rival in the long run. There is ample evidence that US does see India as such, and they foresee a conflict of interest arising out of India’s huge power build up.

The current Indo-US relationship should be viewed in the wider historical perspective of the West-India relationship since 47. There is an opinion that Pakistan should sort out its disputes with India in a bilateral way, without bringing US or any other power in. This will mean that, in its political or military fight, it is basically India that Pakistan has to face. One would expect that in such an Indo-Pak confrontation where the mutual/bilateral disputes are being sorted out, the West will stand neutral, and allow the two warring parties to test their strength. However, this has not been the case so far: West has chosen to remain silent or has made a direct intervention to the detriment of Pakistan: in 1971 it allowed India, by its silence, to militarily intervene in East Pakistan; In 1947 it prevented Jinnah (Gen. Gracey threatening to resign) to send armed forces to Kashmir to fight Indian army there, and, fifty two years later, in a striking similarity, it, by direct intervention, prevented Nawaz Sharif to go ahead with Kargil operation against India. This suggests that the post-47 political order in the sub-continent with India as the predominant power and Kashmir divided between the two, is a deliberate arrangement, and the West—Britain in 47 and US now—will not allow this status-quo to be altered militarily, at least in Pakistan’s favour. Both, Gen. Gracy’s threat of resignation in 47 as well as Clinton’s act of stopping Nawaz Sharif 52 years later, amount to one and the same policy—-not allowing Pakistan to change the staus-quo militarily. This strategic reality leads to an important conclusion about Kashmir: For the liberation of Kashmir from India to happen, a ruling regime in Pakistan that is independent, at least, in its dealings with India, (not influenced by West in this regard) is an essential prerequisite.

4) Whenever one talks of the liberation of Kashmir from India, the question of Indian Muslims crops up. This is entirely understandable. However, the present Muslim situation in India, has come about as a result of a long historical process that culminated in the emergence of Pakistan in 1947. Any serious attempt to develop some kind of vision or agenda for the 200m strong Muslim community in India, requires a thorough revisiting of 1947. There are so many either-or frameworks into which Indian Muslim thinking remains straitjacketed, and no emancipation is possible without fully digging into the pre-47 Muslim thought. This requires a full conference in its own right. However, a conference dealing with Kashmir should somehow encompass some basic questions relating to the future of Indian Muslims.

C: Looking Ahead—–Expectations

The overall objective of the conference should be to place Kashmir in the dynamics of the basic conflict, namely the conflict between Islam and non-Islam. This is the real truth, and also has some clear advantages, namely, a) Kashmir problem does not remain a local problem of a small population, b) it places the Kashmir conflict on a higher pedestal where the widely projected controversy of Independence of Kashmir versus accession to Pakistan ceases to have any meaning, and c) since it captures the basic reality of Kashmir conflict, it enables us to foresee, looking at the wider conflict and the globally evolving realities, the future shape this conflict is going to take, the challenges and the opportunities that will come up. A great purpose would have been achieved if the Conference succeeds in establishing Kashmir as basically Pakistan’s issue, and that too not in a narrow nationalistic sense (as some Pakistani nationalists say ‘Kashmir is the jugular vein of Pakistan’, because all the Pakistani rivers originate from Kashmir), but in the wider sense of the future and stability of Islam in South Asia. In this sense, Pakistan emerges as the leader of the movt to liberate Kashmir from India, and Kashmiri Muslims as active supporters in this campaign. Achieving this purpose amounts to killing two birds with a single stone: it paves the way for Pakistan’s more enhanced and decisive involvement in Kashmir conflict, thereby providing an important ingredient for the success of Kashmir movt, and it brings to the fore, Pakistan’s historical role, the role that legitimizes its emergence in the first place. The latter purpose will also serve to influence the political discourse and agenda in Pakistan, which is otherwise too much focussed on the system of governance rather than the historical role and responsibilities. When the genuine critics of Pakistan—those who are not happy with its present situation— complain that Pakistan has not been faithful to its foundational purpose, they generally mean that an Islamic system is not there, and with the narrow sense in which they understand the Islamic system, what they effectively complain about is the non-existence of an interest-free banking and the penal laws, which is often equated with what they call ‘implementation of Quran and Sunnah’. If this was the purpose of Pakistan it could have been achieved in a federated India as well; even Nawaz Sherif can also fulfill it now by promulgating Shariat Bill. It is basically the historical role and the political mission of Islam, of which it has to be the vehicle, that legitimizes Pakistan’s existence. Reclaiming Kashmir is crucial in that regard.

We made a distinction above between KKI and PKI, and further, we noted that during the present movement it is almost exclusively the KKI that has been projected. We need to say something more on this now in order to grasp its real significance.

Any one having the intimate knowledge of the present Kashmir movt will agree that there has been a deliberate attempt, through various seminars and other political events, to establish that Kashmiris (Kashmiri people, Muslims and non-Muslims) living in both parts of Kashmir are the real and central party to the dispute of Kashmir. Among others, United States Institute of Peace(a State department-funded think-tank) conducted some seminars in Washington, precisely to establish this position, and, by and large, political quarters in India have noted this development with satisfaction. A case is being made out as if it is exclusively the Kashmiri people who have all the stakes in the Kashmir conflict, Pakistan has none, and it is merely a party to the dispute, as India is, in the sense that both of them happen to control the two separated parts of Kashmir. In the history of the freedom movement (read anti-India movt) of Kashmir, this thinking did not exist before 1989, the year when the present movt started, and it first originated mainly as the party-stand of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (a secular organisation seeking independence of Kashmir from both India and Pakistan). By now it has almost come to be the unanimous position of the political leadership of the present movt of Kashmir represented by the 13-party umbrella outfit the ‘All party Hurriet Conference’(APHC). This position often translates into APHC’s criticism of Pakistan on the count that the latter is sidelining Kashmiris, talking to India without their participation, not accepting them as the real representative party in the Kashmir conflict. Recently a leading figure in APHC, Abdul Ghani Lone, while on a visit to USA for medical treatment told the media people that it was the “greatest insult” to Kashmiris that India and Pakistan discuss their issue without even consulting them. He also complained that Kashmiris were not even recommended by Pakistan to get an observer status at the Organisation of Islamic Conference. When Mr. Lone was asked what specifically the APHC wanted Pakistan to do for the Kashmiris in political, financial or military terms, he replied: “Just leave us alone.” Here, we are not to comment on the political wisdom or otherwise of such statements; there is something more important we are aiming at, and for that let us go to the other side now, namely Pakistan. The political elites there project such statements as that of Mr Lone as indicative of the hostility that exists in Kashmir against Pakistan. They also call such statements representative of the ‘wishes of Kashmiri people’. With the result these elites argue that Pakistan’s Kashmir policy should accord with the wishes of Kashmiri People. What they effectively mean to say is Pakistan should not get too much involved in Kashmir because of the hostility that exists there against the former, and also, because it is basically the problem of Kashmiris. The crux of the matter is that the corrupt elites of Pakistan, want to unburden themselves of any serious and decisive role in reclaiming Kashmir, and—- this is important to note—– statements as that of Mr Lone come handy to them in this regard: their need is fulfilled. At this point it is very significant to note, that all such forces (insisting on Kashmiris being the real party with exclusive interest) were, in the first place, propped up in Kashmir by Pakistan itself. What does all this suggest? Perhaps a nexus between the corrupt political elites of Pakistan and Kashmir, not basically different from the unholy nexus that existed in 1971between the selfish elites of the then East and West Pakistan. If this continues to be the state of affairs, the elites on both sides may reap their short-term benefits (as did Bhutto and Shiekh Mujib earlier) but the Islamic issue of Kashmir will be the casualty. The conference will be achieving a great historic purpose, if it succeeds in exposing this nexus, establishing Kashmir as basically Islam’s issue, that has historically come to be Pakistan’s top most issue now. The real or the central party as theyare called is not the Kashmiri people, it is the state of Pakistan; Kashmiri people have a central place in the whole conflict in the sense that they are the main sufferers, but when it comes to the political-strategic significance of the issue, and the responsibility of its solution, the state of Pakistan is the real party and the leading edge, with the people of Kashmir in active supportive role. They—-Pakistan and Kashmir—do not have exclusive interest in this conflict; their interest converges on Islam. That must be the case. If this is not the case now, as perhaps it is not, that only shows what is the task ahead.

The basic philosophy behind the main submission made here—Kashmir to be made Pakistan’s issue——is that Pakistan is vital to any program of Islam and Muslim related change that we may envisage in the present South Asia now. As a matter of fact, among all the state and non-state assets now available, it is the most viable entity. If one disagrees with that, saying Pakistan is not the asset, it does not mean a better asset is alternatively available, it simply means no asset is available at all. From the political wreckage of the colonized Indian sub-continent, if anything permanent could be recovered for Islam and Muslims, that is the state of Pakistan; Muslim leadership roles(though only apparent than real) in the Indian National Congress, for example, Abul Kalam Azad once becoming Congress president were, nothing more than one-off events. There are people who do not agree with the creation of Pakistan, and there are others who do, and both have their reasons, but for any positive forward movement now, everyone has to recognize this instrumental value of Pakistan, and plan accordingly.

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Dr. Syed M Inayatullah Andrabi is a well-known figure in the circles of political Islam. Born in Srinagar, the capital city of Indian Held Kashmir, Dr Andrabi has been intimately involved at the intellectual level with the global politics and political issues since his student days in 1980 at Pune (India), where he completed his Ph.D. in Linguistics in 1983 at the Centre of Advanced Study in Linguistics, Deccan College, University of Pune, Pune, India. Upon completing his doctorate he returned home to join the University of Kashmir, first on a post-doctoral fellowship and later as faculty, but could not continue because of the deteriorating security situation in Kashmir, and had to move to United Kingdom in 1994 where he continues to live since along with his wife and five children.