Kashmir Conflict, What motivates India’s activism. A closer Examination in a Global Framework???

Introduction

With the formation of a new United Front (UF) Government in India in June this year, Indian rulers initiated a fresh series of moves regarding Kashmir with the stated intent of bringing ‘peace to the troubled Valley’ and to the region as a whole. The most important UF leaders including V P Singh, the Indian Prime Minister Deve Gowda, CPM Chairman Harkishan Singh Surjeet made high profile visits to the occupied land and declared their intent of bringing ‘peace’ by holding ‘elections’ and restoring ‘maximum autonomy’ to Jammu and Kashmir. A similar climate prevailed on the other track— the Indo-Pak track. Rulers of both the countries exchanged warm greetings. Pakistani rulers expressed new hopes and offered to negotiate with India if Kashmir was put on the agenda of talks. On yet another track, which we prefer to call ‘Master track’, things were more visible and ‘phenomenal’. This track is the one relating U.S in three separate sub-tracks to India, Pakistan and Kashmir. There was high drama on this track and the U.S ambassador to India Frank Wisner was the main hero playing a dazzling and youthful title role of Mr Peace in the ‘peace-drama’. He made jaunts to Srinagar, Islamabad and went on lecturing on the importance of ‘peace’ and of the political process that must get initiated in Kashmir now, as a step towards ‘peace’.

These political developments on all these tracks created a sort of euphoria. An impression was sought to be created that the 50-year old Kashmir problem was about to be solved overnight by the new rulers who have descended on the Indian throne. The truth is that there was nothing in real terms— no word or deed— from Indian rulers that could suggest such a prospect. There was not an iota of change in India’s basic positions: Kashmir is an integral part of India, elections in Kashmir will normalise the situation there, Pakistan is creating problems in Kashmir— all these positions remained entirely unchanged— indeed these were clearly reiterated by the new rulers. However, the basis on which euphoria was built, was that a new government with a new thinking (with almost everything ‘new’ by this logic) had assumed power in Delhi. But all this was questionable. what after all was new with the UF government or its approach? For the sake of argument if one would concede that there was something new and a ‘new beginning’ in Kashmir was made and it was due to a ‘new’ government in Delhi even then the euphoria that was generated concealed a very simple fact that UF Kashmir moves were not an independent initiative of this regime; this regime owed its existence to the support of Congress and was dependent on that. If UF government had to seek Congress approval on all the important matters of the state, how come it could act on its own on such a uniquely vital matter as that of Kashmir. So the euphoria was basically misplaced and for very obvious and simple reasons.

However, the activism evidenced on all the tracks did point to something very important. It pointed to a highly significant truth that India was really meaning to do ‘something’ about Kashmir, it was somehow finding it necessary to do so. Hardening of the basic positions on one hand and activism on the other— the two facts taken together indicated that Kashmir issue was not going to be resolved— nothing of that sort was attempted and no step towards that direction was being taken— but, nevertheless, India was in a way very desperate to do ‘something’ about it as if to get rid of it. The question arises why? Because of the ongoing movement, could be an easy answer but that is too simplistic to account for what in reality is a complex matter. For it suggests that India is in a way doing a mere fire-fighting exercise: it is caught in a difficult situation in Kashmir from which it is trying to come out and that’s the end of it. Things, however, are not that simple and one has to look beyond. India is trying to ‘normalise’ the situation in Kashmir— O.K, but what is India’s interest in doing that; ‘normalisation’ per se cannot be nor can be the ‘return of peace and prosperity’ in Kashmir as a result of ‘normalisation’, so what can be India’s interest in making any move regarding Kashmir? And if it were mere fire-fighting, why should U.S be involved the way it is? In the recent activism on Kashmir, what, therefore, needs to be explored is the question of real interest— wider and long-term— that motivates India’s Kashmir moves and the U.S support of these moves. It is mainly this task that is being undertaken in this paper. We explore this question of real interest in the conceptual framework of the New World Order— the new international system evolving under this Order and India’s place and role in it. It turns out that as in the New World Order an international system comprising many ‘great powers’ as opposed to the old system comprising mainly two ‘great powers’, U.S and the Soviet Union, coming up, India is perceiving itself as one of the ‘great powers’ in the emerging system and it is being propped up as such by the predominant powers in the New World Order. Accordingly, India is now trying to ‘disengage’ itself from all those immediate-regional issues, conflicts and involvement which work as drags on its global activism. Kashmir is the chief drag. The whole discussion also provides a wider/global perspective in which one should view or analyze in an integrated way, all Kashmir related activism on the above mentioned tracks not only with reference to what’s currently going on but in general as well. This perspective appears to be the correct frame of looking at things, when towards the end of this paper we take a brief analytical view of what India is currently doing in Kashmir, for example elections etc. etc. . We close our discussion with conclusions and recommendations for various concerned quarters.

1) India and the New World Order (NWO)

In this section we will be exploring in detail India’s emerging place and role in the NWO, the main dimension of its role and spheres of its activism.

1.1) The NWO–Some Fundamental Points

Before coming to the specific discussion of India’s emerging role in the global order, some general but fundamental points by way of a footnote about the NWO itself may be useful and also relevant to the subsequent discussion.

1.1.1) What is and is Not New About NWO

Underlying the present political order is the materialistic civilizational order that got initiated with the colonial mission of the European nations some centuries back. As such this civilizational order, which is global in span now, is called Western civilization or in short the West. The ideological basis of this civilization is absolute materialism; its method, in essence, loot and plunder; its over-riding concern, security– security to overcome its insecurity— real as well as perceived, and more perceived than real; and its ultimate objective absolute power and dominance.

As regards its basis, method, concerns and ultimate objective there is not a grain of newness in the so-called NWO. ‘There are no fundamental changes and no new paradigms are needed to make sense of what is happening.’1 However the way this civilizational order is administered and ordered at the political level has been changing and will continue to change. The political set-up, the main players in the order, power-relations between them etc. etc.— these things always keep changing and the changes are done basically to ensure the survival of the order. In this century alone we have seen three apparently different political orders: one after the first World War, the other after the second and the third proclaimed by George Bush after the war on Iraq which was termed by him as the NWO.

1.1.2) Why the Political Orders Keep Changing

This is almost a natural process. However, in case of materialistic orders, one has to understand that a materialistic civilization can only generate endless greed which will engage the individual participants in a wild rivalry and an ever-increasing zeal to displace and defeat each other. Thus power remains changing from one participant to another; for example, it shifted from Britain to U.S in the post-45 world order. Also those in the back seat, having grown ambitious over a period of time and having fully internalised the art of plunder also rise up, not in revolt against the basis and the method of the existing order but for their ‘rightful’ place in it. In the present World-order back-seaters are often the ruling elites of the so-called third world countries who while in agreement with the ideological basis , methods, security concerns of those in the driving seat, rise up with the slogan: All is well and good but where do we stand? Why are we being ignored? It is, therefore, no wonder that the earliest calls for a new world order that preceded Bush’s proclamation of NWO came jointly from such enthusiastic back seat actors as India, Malaysia, Tanzania, Brazil etc. etc. grouped together in what was called the South Commission. The Commission while declaring that “North also needs South” called for ‘partnership’ between the South and the rich North.2 Note that ‘partnership’ was a key notion later in subsequent expositions of the NWO by U.S. (cf. 1.2.3)

1.1.3) What World-Orders are Ultimately About

World-orders in general are not ultimately about wealth and material resources. They are about absolute dominance and control over the bodies and the minds of the people. This is an accepted fact that ‘in international politics wealth is not the primary goal: states continue to be willing to pay a high price to maintain their security, autonomy, and to spread their values’3 NWO seeks to impose ‘values’ of the western civilization which basically means a package—- the western consumerist lifestyle, and ideology which means democracy.4

1.1.4) The Component of Real Change

In the change of political orders not all the aspects of the change may be worth of keen attention. In fact, it may turn out that in the deafening noise of change there is a little amount of what can reasonably be called the real change. But, nevertheless, this little amount has got to be identified. Every emerging political order takes a fresh look of the strategic and security environment and forms definite perceptions about short and long term strategic and security threats. These perceived threats are of two types. One— The Global, threatening the order itself; the other— Particular, threatening the predominant power(s) within the order. The source of the former threat is perceived to be outside the order, whereas that of the latter lies within the order itself, that is, the threat comes from relatively weaker power(s) within the order. In response to these threat-perceptions a full range of security institutions are created and a network of security relationships gradually emerge over a period of time. These security relationships, alliances, institutions, bring about a change in the strategic scenario, which must be carefully understood. This change may, in fact, form the component of real change that comes with a new political order. As regards security alliances and threat perceptions, a few important points have to be noted:

1.1.4.1) Prominence of Pacific Alliance

The alliance linking US with Asia-Pacific region is becoming and will continue to become more and more important than the present Atlantic alliance (linking US with Europe). This is because of:

• Growing economic and, therefore, political and security importance of Asia-Pacific region, and

• Decreasing dependence of Europe on U.S after the break-up of Soviet-Union.

1.1.4.2) Emergence of G-7

With the replacement of post-45 world-order by NWO the political, economic and security institutions of the old Order namely the United Nations (UN) family of institutions and Bretton Woods institutions namely IMF and World Bank are already in decline as far as their governing role in their respective areas is concerned.5 Instead, G-7 (the grouping of seven industrialised nations, namely, U.S, Canada, Britain, France, Germany, Japan and Italy (on behalf of European Union (EU)) or to be precise G71/2 ( 1/2 referring to Russia’s partial participation)6, is increasingly assuming the role of a ‘central forum for the overall political management of the post-cold war era’.7 This is, because ‘neither the UN Security Council, NATO, nor the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) can offer similar scope in terms of including the key players, though they and other organizations will continue to play important roles in certain issues.’8

1.1.4.3) Perception of Security Issues and Threats

The NWO has a very ‘complex’ perception of security issues and threats. We cannot fully venture into this domain here for the obvious reason that NWO by itself is not our topic of inquiry. However, some points of general interest and relevance to our subsequent discussion deserve to be mentioned.9

The NWO and the leading players in it like US have an imposing military, political and economic power, and highly developed systems in these fields. But the point of interest here is that the overwhelming sophistication of these systems often hides their extreme fragility which is inherent in them. Take for example the economic system and the case of international business which forms the bulk of world economic activity. Now, as Dr Peter Ackerman a London based leading financial analyst informs us, international businesses ‘are more vulnerable than ever to threats of organized violence’, and are, therefore, ‘fragile enterprises… even implied threats can destroy the market for a product in many countries simultaneously’. Dr Ackerman goes on talking about ‘new kinds of security threats’ like for example, an induced computer virus, or such other sabotage techniques against microchip based systems.’10 This is again an instance of fragility that U.S administration recently called for something equivalent of the Manhattan Project to thwart ‘terrorist’ and ‘foreign’ attacks with catastrophic potential against U.S.A’s computer networks.11

What emerges from all this, is that NWO finds the security threats to itself rapidly changing, and newer and newer threats coming up. Islam, or fundamentalism as it is called by the secular world is also projected as a new threat having replaced communism. This is not wholly true. Islam is not a new threat. It has been the only threat of global nature and the most serious one to the secular western civilization right from the latter’s inception and given the fact that Islam continues to be an active aspirant for political power and also is totally incompatible with the secular civilization it remains the only rival (the one refusing to die inspite of being ‘repeatedly killed’) to the present world order and, therefore, a long term threat to it. More specifically it is considered to be the only obstacle to NWO’s project of ‘spreading the Empire of democracy’.12 However, there is really some ‘newness’ in the threat of Islam which mainly has to be found in the form and nature of this threat and which makes it a threat to NWO in the short-term as well. This ‘new ‘ threat does not come from an Islamic block of states or a militarily powerful state in the organized form of a war, it comes from the movement of Islamic awakening and activism that has been rapidly developing throughout the Muslim Ummah for some time now, particularly after the Islamic revolution of Iran. This movement is in a diffuse form and, therefore, takes different forms at different places according to the political context. For example, it can be a movement against non-Muslim occupation of Muslim lands (Kashmir, Chechenia) or the one against West’s proxy regimes (Egypt). But whatever the form, the threat that comes from this movement is ‘internal’ to states and this is the most important thing to note. It is on the basis of this nature of new Islamic threat that the strategists of NWO are treating Islam as a threat to the ‘stability’ of the key states i.e the states that have to be major players in NWO like India and Russia, for example. So the states that have to shoulder the responsibility of international order are considered to be threatened not from outside by an organised armed attack by a state i.e interstate war, but from the very inside by the Islamic movement. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) which gives a representative view of the West’s strategic community, in its 1995 year book notes: ‘the main source of the threat in the world today are not conflicts between states but within them.’13 We will be reverting to this theme again when we discuss the specific case of India and its perception of this new Islamic threat at (1.4.4.1).

Here at the end we have to note that the emergence of ‘new’ security threats and issues has been one of the main factors that gave G-7 the leading role in global security governance ‘with a flexibility to respond in a timely way to new and emerging security challenges’ 14.

1.2) Broad Outlines of the Emerging International System

Let us look, very briefly, at what were the changes on the global level that came with the break-up of the Soviet Union.

• First— It was the demise of a major military power which left U.S as the strongest among so many strong military powers of the world.

• Second— Military alliances hinged on Soviet military power, disappeared.

As a result of these changes, as almost all political analysts agree, a situation very much similar to nineteenth century Europe has emerged. There are so many strong and competing powers but no single overwhelmingly powerful nation to dominate and shape the global agenda. U.S continues to aspire for global hegemony but it does not have the required capability. It cannot police the world single-handedly; the American tax payer is not ready for such a commitment. There are so many other reasons also, for example, one among them that ‘power has become more diffuse’ as Henry Kissinger would like us to believe, that have actually reduced U.S’s ability to have a decisive role in global affairs.15

In this situation, two main considerations are shaping the international system that is gradually emerging under the NWO. One is the consideration of manageability. How in a changed situation the NWO agenda can be advanced uninterruptedly. Particularly, how continued ‘economic growth’ will be ensured, and how ‘security threats’ can be warded off.

The other is the consideration of interest. The predominant powers in the NWO, not ready to give up voluntarily their predominance, want to ensure that through any system that emerges, they are able to advance their interest.

The two considerations overlap in the sense that the former is almost subservient to the latter. Because of their overlap, the two considerations fuse into a yet ‘higher’ consideration namely that of ‘stability’- that magic word which is used to mean nothing more than the maintenance of order in such a state that the vital interest of the dominant powers remain safe and secure.

1.2.1) Concert System

With an emerging state-system resembling that of nineteenth century Europe, the only workable system seems to be some kind of a concert system within which the key states in the NWO can operate. This concert system operated in Europe after 1814 and lasted till the first World War. G-7 already represents a concert system and its authoritative reach is attributed to its having all the concert characteristics.16 Concert systems are based more on ‘common values’17 than on fixed rules (as for example UN which is not a concert system, in theory at least, is based on a UN Charter. How the Charter and the rules are manipulated by the dominant powers is besides the point here) and its participants are bound together, among other things, by commonality of purpose i.e they all have a shared interest in preserving the order.

1.2.2) Key States

Henry Kissinger sees the emergence of six major players in the future international system. These are U.S, Europe, China, Japan, Russia and ‘probably’ India.18 However, the basic point to understand is that it is not the question of this or that country becoming a key-player; there are explicit ground rules laid down by the NWO for the constitution of the international system. International system will be constituted by what Bill Clinton called ‘world’s community of market democracies’19 and it will be strengthened on the basis of Clinton’s doctrine of ‘Enlargement’20, which means ‘expanding’ “the community of market democracies” by increasing their strength and numbers’21… . The key states need not be ‘democracies’ in the technical sense of the term; for that matter China is not. All that is required of them is that they should be fanatic believers in the religion of money i.e should be pro-Market and they should have a firm commitment to ward off any threats to the Order i.e a commitment to fight Islam.

1.2.3) Type of Relationship

The key states in the system will have a relationship of ‘partnership’22, where all of them will equally share the ‘cost and commitment’ 23 for advancing the NWO agenda.

1.2.4) Military-Strategic Dimension

The international system will have overwhelming strategic and military dimensions. It is noteworthy that Clinton’s enlargement doctrine was later modified into the military-strategic doctrine ‘engagement’ which was explained in early 1994 by General John Shalikasvili, the chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff as a strategy that ‘comprised the prevention of major threats to regional stability and partnership with friends and allies to help them take greater responsibility for peace and stability in their own regions”24.

1.2.5) Functioning of the System

The emerging system will function through international organizations, both, at global as well as regional levels. The organizations will work towards the twin objectives of expanding markets, and fighting Islam in the name of global or regional security as the case may be. For example, G-7, as mentioned above is the international organization at global level through which the international system functions: It promotes political-economic agenda of NWO and it chalks out strategies to fight Islam in the name of global security.25 Likewise European Union (EU), is an instance of international organization at the regional level, through which the system functions. Last year in November the EU held a special summit in Barcelona, Spain to which in addition to Morocco, eleven countries (almost all Muslim) from southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean were invited. This was done precisely for the same two objectives mentioned above: to create, by 2010 a free trade zone called the Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area (EMEA) and to combat Islam in the name of regional security. As John Hooper writing in The Guardian noted, the northern countries on the Mediterranean ‘endorse the Western European Union and NATO papers argument that the main strategic threat to Europe comes from fundamentalism’26. So by extending the consumerist umbrella across to the South of Mediterranean, the North was working on the logic that “the only way to quell extremism is by offering people the real hope of prosperity.”27

1.2.6) Integration of Asia-Pacific Region

In Asia, the Asia-Pacific region is getting fast integrated into the emerging system and organizations like ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF), and Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC) may in future emerge as the main organizations through which the international system will function in that region.

1.2.7) ‘Stabilizing’ Mechanism

The international system will be ‘stabilised’ by the balance-of-power mechanism between the key players and it is through this mechanism that the predominant powers of the NWO will advance their interests.

1.3)International System in Asia: A Balance-of-Power (BoP) Regime

There has been some serious thinking going on regarding the regional order i.e NWO at the regional level, in Asia. The 34th annual conference of London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) held at Seoul, South Korea from 9th to 12th Sept 1992 deliberated on the theme: Asia’s international role in post-Cold War Era.28 Also, some important papers relating to this theme have come up from the institute in recent years.29 There have been some visible developments on the ground as well— for example, the Pacific Alliance becoming more important than the Atlantic one (cf.1.1.4.1 above). What seems to be fairly clear now is that the strategists of the NWO want a BoP regime to come up in Asia. It will be an international system comprising of ‘five major powers and several important middle powers.’30 The five major powers proposed include besides U.S, Russia, India, China and Japan. Among the middle powers Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan and Koreas may become the active players in the international system.31

1.2.3) Type of Relationship

1.3.1) BoP– What it really means

BoP is a mechanism by which equilibrium is achieved between more than one almost equal and competing powers. As such it is basically about ‘stability’.32 Western political scientists would like us to entertain very high images of the BoP concept, but they are no more than illusions. Britain is credited with being the originator of the concept and its successful practitioner in the last century. But that makes it more easy to understand that the BoP mechanism is a highly exploitative strategy cleverly employed by colonial powers for their domination. Let us note some points briefly regarding the BoP and this regime in Asia. The BoP system thrives on exploiting the mutual fears of the equal or almost equal powers. Thus, for example, in the above mentioned BoP system in Asia U.S will exploit the mutual fears of various competing powers and acting as the balancer (being strongest amongst all the players) will enjoy the ultimate power. Also it legitimizes the power ambitions of such greedy powers as for example India or Russia, by conferring on them the major power status. The BoP order takes as its basis someone’s being major and someone’s being minor. Therefore, any attempt by a ‘minor’ power, for example, Pakistan, seeking parity with a ‘major’ power, for example, India, is regarded as threatening the order and hence a destabilising attempt. And, since, BoP regime ‘works best, when it keeps dissatisfaction below the level at which the aggrieved party will seek to overthrow the international order’ 33, it seeks to deliberately block the change that could bring justice to the aggrieved party. The last point but not the least in importance is that BoP— the concept as well as operation— is based primarily on military power.

1.3.2) Objectives

The international system in Asia is designed with the same two objectives mentioned earlier: unbridled economic growth; securing the region from Islam, i.e regional security.

1.3.3) U.S Interest in Multi-Polar BoP System

A multipolar Asian BoP is the ‘best context for the protection of U.S interests in twenty-first century Asia.’34 Among the U.S interests is, for example, ‘freedom of the high seas, including the important sea routes through south-east Asia’35, but the chief interest which overrides every other is to maintain a powerful hegemonic role in the region. The five-power BoP regime is the best bet for it. Reasons:

• a) China is an obsession with Western strategic mind and is regarded as capable of throwing a challenge to U.S’s role in the region. BoP system is often a way of ganging up against someone who is capable of hegemony, but has got to be deprived of it. Through five power BoP regime U.S sees a sure method of denying China any chance of becoming predominant in the region. India which has always been seen as a counterweight against china, is, however, ‘unlikely in itself’, ever to balance it. On the other hand, in the five-sided BoP system there are sufficient major players to ensure that a regional hegemon does not emerge.36

• b) With the nations of comparable power vying for influence with each other the security situation becomes fluid. The fluidity of security environment which necessarily develops in a BoP regime, suits best the U.S’s interest in Asia-Pacific or the broader Asian region or for that matter any other region. Since, as mentioned earlier, BoP is based primarily on military power, U.S being militarily the most powerful, it ‘only can ensure that dangerous power asymmetries do not emerge’37. Thus in such a situation of fluidity Henry Kissinger sees U.S attitude as a ‘wild card’, as according to him U.S ‘has the capacity— though not necessarily the philosophy— to function in much the same way that Great Britain did in maintaining the European BoP until the two world wars of the twentieth century.’38

1.3.4) Indications of the Emerging Regional Order

One may argue that the five power BoP system we have been talking about, is not visible anywhere. Neither in a lose informal way nor in the form of an institution. India, China, Russia, Japan and U.S do not constitute some sort of a formal or informal concert system. So what is this regional order we are talking about? The answer to that is, that we are basically talking about the emergence of a regional order, and we talk on the basis of a logic and very definite and clear indications.

Logic: Orders emerge and take shape gradually. Also not all the dimensions of an order take equal time to emerge in a definite shape. Thus, for example, the NWO at global and regional levels is more visible in terms of new economic realities, alliances, changes but its military-strategic dimension which will be visible through a network of multilateral and bilateral security relationships, will take some relatively longer time to take shape and emerge.39 So the economic realities and socio-cultural changes that are under way at present place us in a position to say what kind of an order in military-strategic terms is going to come up in future.

Indications: As to the indications, two important points deserve mention. First, this regional order alone provides a context in which interests of the predominant powers of NWO particularly U.S remain secure. It has to be emphasised, that predominance is the last thing that U.S- the post-45 predominant power- will be ready to part with. If Japan has outstripped U.S in economic field, that does not mean a smooth transition of predominance from U.S to Japan or Asia-Pacific as a whole. U.S is in no doubt on the road to decline but upto its last breath it will continue devising newer and newer schemes to save its ‘leadership’. Through the five power BoP, U.S is containing not only China (cf. 1.3.3) but virtually everyone (Japan, Russia, India) by the other or others. This is the only and the most effective mechanism through which U.S can remain engaged in Asia with a self-imposed leadership role and there should be no doubt that U.S is determined not to give up this engagement.40 So, this is an indication that an order of this pattern will be sought to be promoted because this alone is compatible with U.S interests. The other indication is that with the exception of India (to the discussion of which we will turn in the next section), all the three Asian players in the regional order under discussion i.e Russia, China and Japan are already active players in the global order and integrated into the international system at the global level. China and Russia are U.N security council members. Japan and Russia- the latter partially- are the members of G-7. Also, all of them- India included ‘share’ the security concerns of the NWO, and have demonstrated their will and enthusiasm to cooperate with each other in maintaining regional security and stability41 i.e in fighting Islam. Moreover, all of them i.e Russia, China, Japan and India are either already ‘market democracies’ or are on the way to join ‘the community of market democracies'(cf.1.2.2). All the above things taken together, it becomes clear that if a regional order in Asia has got to be put in place, they i.e Russia, China, Japan and India, are the ‘best’ available stuff with which to proceed. And if the shape and form of this order has to be subservient to the interests of the predominant powers in the NWO, which it has got to be, than what else than a BoP regime can be the ‘best’ thing to come up. Also, this should be kept in mind that although a five-power BoP is not visible at the moment, yet U.S-Japanese alliance is already in place and this is going to be the ‘key strategic alignment’42 around which a more broad-based regional order, as, for example, the five-power BoP regime will evolve. So a visible infrastructure is already there; there is a sound logic and there are important indications. All this makes the proposition that a multipolar BoP regime is going to emerge in Asia, a sensible one.

1.4) India as one of the key states

After discussing the broad outlines of the emerging international order at the global and regional levels above, we will now turn to the discussion of India as a key state in the emerging order. India’s role as a key state in the international system will comprise:

• A wider regional (as distinct from merely sub-continental) role and important ‘responsibilities’ in the region.

• A close co-operation with the predominant powers particularly U.S on the ‘vital issues’ on NWO agenda.

1.4.1) The changes on the ground

The role of India will gradually unfold with the NWO taking a definite shape at global and regional levels. However, considered proposals regarding India’s role in the emerging global order (not just political statements) have been coming up in recent years from very responsible quarters i.e strategic planners and institutions, political thinkers and analysts. In terms of some practical steps also India has made some headway in the direction of its emerging role. To all this we will return shortly, first, we will have a brief look at something more important: the changes on the ground that are now under way in India and are absolutely essential to India’s qualifying as a key state in the international system. We believe there are definite ‘ground rules’ on the basis of which one can be either integrated into or isolated from the international system depending on conforming or not conforming to the ‘rules’. These ‘rules’ laid down by Clinton (cf.1.2.2) are summed up in just two words, ‘market democracies’. For a state to be included among the key states in the international system, its being a market democracy is essential. So let us see with reference to concrete changes on the ground, how India is on the road to join the ‘community of market democracies’ (cf.1.2.2). To get a better appreciation of these changes i.e to understand what type of changes a state should be undergoing in order to qualify as a market democracy let us again be clear about the meaning of market democracy in the NWO. The term ‘Market Democracy’ has two components namely:

• Market— this covers the changes in the economic system. Free and liberalised economy driven by market forces makes this state a ‘market’.

• Democracy— the essential meaning of democracy for the West is mentioned in fn.4 below. People’s participation in the governance of a country is definitely not the essential meaning of democracy. Is Iran ever referred to as a democracy, although people duly participate in the governance there? By democracy is meant a whole socio-cultural package— that is a way and system of life with no absolute norms, values and rules of right or wrong and unchecked ‘freedoms’ in all spheres of life. A state qualifies as a democracy when it fulfils these requirements.

Therefore, by market democracy what is meant is a state with a free economy and unchecked ‘freedoms’ all along (restricted only by perceived self-interest). With this understanding we will look for two types of changes on ground now underway in India:

a) Economic: There have been tremendous changes going on in the Indian economy for the past seven or eight years. A brief summary of economic changes and other related developments: The actual foreign direct investment (FDI) between 1991 and Jan 1994 was in excess of US$ 1 bn 43 and by 1997 FDI is going to touch US$ 4.5 bn mark.44

Foreign investors have been investing on an average of US$ 300-400 m every month since the beginning of 1996.45

There was more U.S investment in India in 1994 than in the previous 40 years46 and this year alone it was totalling US$ 5 bn.47

Star T.V is expected to invest U.S$ 1.4 bn in 1997 when, as it looks most likely, it will set up its operation head quarters in Karnataka- the southern province of India. One of the reasons for choosing India can be that India is the single largest source of revenue for Star T.V (40%) followed next by Taiwan (37%)48.

Market capitalization on Indian money markets stood at Rs.1,102,790 m in July 199149 i.e approximately US$ 34 bn and now the Professional Investor in its August ’96 issue reports that it has gone up to US$ 140 bn , and this according to it makes India a ‘market too big to ignore’50. Among the multinational corporations entering Indian market, automobile companies have entered in a big way and in this sector according to Bombay stock exchange president M G Damani, ‘you name any giant in the world and they are trying to set up a shop here’51. In July 1994 after the then Indian Prime Minister P V Narisimah Rao’s U.S visit, the Aid India Consortium was renamed as India Development Forum, and this is taken to be a significant move.52 It signals the India’s creditor-nations’ decision to invest in India instead of merely aiding.

An India interest group consisting of 31 major U.S multinational corporations investing in India was formed with active Indian encouragement.53 This has become a strong and influential support group for India in U.S.54

b) Socio-Cultural: In (a) we listed some facts from which the truth of India turning into market is clearly deducible . Now we will list a few facts which point to India’s becoming a democracy. Thus from the facts in (a) and (b) taken together the truth of India joining the ‘community of market democracies’ will become manifest.

Cable T.V has mesmerised the Indian Hindus. Channels like Zee or Star are highly popular. Out of three Star-Viewers one is Indian.55 Because of this popularity Rupert Murdoch, owner of Star T.V is seriously thinking of moving his operation headquarters from Hong Kong (the present location) to India in 1997. Already Star T.V has a building on 60,000 sq. feet in Bombay which is to be used as Indian operating head quarter.56

A new sex-channel is going to be launched soon on Indian T.V named +21. It will be the first such adult late night channel showing sex, seduction and violence. It will take off with a hundred part serial based on ‘Kamasutra’ an ancient ‘comprehensive sex guide’ of Pagan India. It will be free for the first year and will be converted into a pay channel the next.57

India for the first time is holding a ‘Miss World Contest’. The event is organised by Amitabh Bachan, a leading film star and formerly a member of parliament of the Lower House of Indian Parliament. To be held in Banglore, a South Indian city, in November this year, the event is expected to be seen by 2 bn TV viewers in almost hundred countries.58

1.4.2) Voices in Support of India’s Wider/Global Role

Our purpose in the preceding section was to show on the basis of some factual evidence that if the voices about a wider/global Indian role are heard from responsible quarters it is not just rhetoric; these voices are well thought out and India is really propped up as a key state capable of actually discharging wider/global role. In this section we will briefly allude to the sources wherefrom the voices of India’s wider global role are being heard.

Dr Stephen Cohen, an India-expert, speaking at the 34th annual conference of the international institute of strategic studies, held in Soeul in Sept. 1992, declared ‘there is a unanimous agreement that India should be a global power…’59 Similar voices are heard from so many others, among them Henry Kissinger, Paul Dibb, Raju Thomas60 etc. etc. . On the assumption of power by Bharitaya Janata party (BJP) in Delhi, albeit for a brief tenure, the U.S state department spokesman Nicholas Burns said on May 16 that ‘India for us is one of the key states for stability in 21st century.’61 The European Commission’s (EC) vice-president Manuel Marin in a recent interview to the senior associate editor of India Today echoed almost the same view: The EU and in particular the EC have considered India an important and essential partner in the Asiatic World.’62 India itself has always nurtured a great power ambition. Although, it has not made a noise about it, its ambitions are very clearly reflected in:

• seeking a permanent seat at the U.N security council

• A huge naval build-up

• Missile programme that enhances India’s capability to deliver nuclear or other war heads.

1.4.3)India’s Role: Its Main Dimension

India’s wider role will have an overwhelming military-strategic dimension. India will be a key player in all such schemes, strategies, relationships and alliances that come up to address the security concerns of NWO. As was said at (1.1.4.3) the NWO perceives Islam as a threat at the global level i.e threatening the order as a whole and then there are particular threat perceptions of the predominant powers in NWO e.g U.S and western Europe perceiving China as a threat to their predominance. India shares, both, the global and the particular threat perceptions of the NWO and has shown a missionary zeal to act as a key player in the international system for countering these threats. The statement of the U.S state dept. spokesman mentioned earlier brings out precisely this character of India’s emerging role. India’s men in charge themselves conceive of India’s role mainly in these terms i.e military-strategic and so does the India’s strategic community.63

1.4.4) India’s Role: Sphere’s of Activism

India’s spheres of activism will be, both, global as well as regional. India’s activism in the global sphere is and will be indexed by the deepening Indo-U.S relationship, and that in the regional sphere by India’s growing involvement in the regional international system.

1.4.4.1) Global sphere

Indo-U.S defence relationship is not entirely new. There had been a close defence relationship in John F Kennedy’s tenure and also behind India’s nuclear and missile build-up there has been a vital element of U.S support. However, in the present Indo-U.S relationship there is an element of newness which was formally introduced by U.S defence secretary William Perry’s visit to India last year. According to India’s strategic thinkers it was for the first time that India was engaged in a ‘strategic dialogue’ with any country.64 Before this, Indo-U.S defence dialogue used to address bilateral security concerns, but for the first time Indo-U.S talks centred on the issue of security as such in the NWO and on the ways of partnership in countering security threats. U.S Ambassador to India Frank Wisner had earlier set the tone for Perry’s visit when in an address to United Service Institution in New Delhi in November 1994 he said: Global security will depend on the co-operation of great powers— the U.S, Europe, Russia, China, Japan and India — working together.65 Later, during Perry’s visit in the third week of Jan 1995 it was noted in ‘agreed minutes’ between him and the Indian Minister of State for Defence that ‘our mutual concerns about new threats to international security ensure appropriate conditions for expanding Indo-U.S military co-operation and contacts to our mutual benefit.’66 These ‘agreed minutes’ did not create some essentially new reality on the ground; the U.S planes bombarding Iraq during the Gulf War in 1991 were refuelled at Bombay without ‘agreed minutes’ being signed then. Indo-U.S agreements merely accorded ‘recognition to a welcome turn in the global security environment’67, an environment in which India’s wider role needed to be legitimatized. ‘New threats’ to ‘international security’ becoming the basis of Indo-U.S co-operation reflects significantly India’s security perceptions: For India security threats lie beyond its frontiers. This perception as such is not new; its articulation is. It is precisely this perception that lies at the core of India’s decision to explode a nuclear device in 1974, not to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and now, not to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). What is significant is that so far India came up only with moral pretensions without articulating the real reason, but now while opposing CTBT India openly linked this opposition to its ‘national security considerations’68 and these considerations were ‘ dealt with in a kind of detail never attempted before’69 (emphasis mine). This decision to articulate its security perceptions clearly has to do with India’s emerging role as a key state in the NWO. This also has to be noted that the threat beyond frontiers that India perceives is basically Islam, which Professor R Thomas rather candidly characterizes as ‘an indeterminate complex mix of ‘external’ ‘internal’ and ‘transnational’ threats.’70 On this basis Shekhar Gupta, the senior editor of India Today in his research paper foresees that among other things ‘commonly shared perceptions of regional stability and the threat of expanding militant Islam will be areas of agreement between India and the U.S in the near future.’71

1.4.4.2) Regional Sphere

In the regional sphere India’s activism will be through

(i) its engagement in Asian BoP system (cf. 1.3);

(ii) Its participation in region’s international organizations ASEAN, ARF etc. etc. and

(iii) Its political-cultural incursions into Central Asian region.

(a) Engagement in the BoP system: The basic objective of India’s engagement here will be, in concert with others, to balance China. in this role, West is confident about India as being ultimately the Anglo-Saxon proxy, so much so that if sometime in future the so-called Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ occurs and China and Japan unite against U.S, even then Western strategists are sure, India will side with U.S and Russia.72 It is interesting to note that as back as in 1966 Alastair Buchan, the then director of the IISS, London argued in an article in Encounter (Dec. 1966) that a Japanese-Australian-Indian entente might form a countervailing force to China and thus provide the basis for an internal Asian power-balance. Buchan went on arguing that the three Asian powers could assume broad regional responsibilities while strengthening its military capability.73

(b) ASEAN, ARF participation: Here the objective of Indian role will be to get a close access to the political-security decision-making of Asia-Pacific. Recently India has been made full dialogue partner of ASEAN and also member of ARF. India was also invited to a one-day closed door ministerial meeting of ARF, that took place in Djakarta on July 23, 1996.74 While promoting its economic interests through ASEAN, India will work for regional ‘security’ and ‘stability’ through ARF which in effect means working for vital U.S political and economic interest in the region. ‘Closer U.S-Indian security ties’ some analysts say, will add ‘a new element to the evolving security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region.’75

(c) Incursions into Central Asian region: Indian incursions into Central Asian region seek to promote global interests of the NWO. Indian leaders visited Central Asian States and almost every Head of State from Central Asian republics visited India within six months of their independence. The main theme promoted through all these visits was the threat from ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘importance of secularism for regional stability.’76

2) Constraints on India’s Role: The Real Significance of Kashmir

In some detail, we described in (1.4) India’s place and role in the emerging international system. We concluded that:

• India is being propped up as a key state to enable it to take ‘greater responsibility for peace and stability.’ (cf. 1.2.4)

In this section we will consider that given that India is built-up into a perfect market democracy, and made capable of taking up ‘greater responsibilities’, what are even then the decisive constraints on India’s wider/global role?

2.1) Two Constraints

There is a sort of consensus in the strategic community that India’s role is constrained mainly by two factors and unless these factors are not removed, India cannot take off in the role that is being envisaged for it in the NWO.77 The two factors are:

• India’s sub-continental security preoccupations, mainly with Pakistan as a result of which India’s policies and role becomes Pak-determined; and

• Threats to India’s ‘stability’, about which the consensus opinion is that these threats are mostly internal78 arising from religious, cultural and racial conflicts.

2.1.1) The Constraints — In What Sense ?

Before moving further, let us understand in what sense the above mentioned factors are constraints on India’s role? What is meant by these two factors being constraints?

In the new international dispensation India as one of Asia’s ‘great’ powers is supposed to ‘devise a new form of strategic engagement with the wider Asian region’79 , coordinating and colluding in a bilateral and global context with the great powers like China, Japan, Russia and U.S. The relation of India with these powers should be independent of India’s and these powers’ relations with Pakistan or with India’s other sub-continental neighbours. Now, if India’s relations with other powers are determined by their relations with Pakistan which has been the case so far, this becomes a constraint on India’s acting as one among the key states in the international system because this way India’s subcontinental security concerns dominate its outlook and policies and it remains ‘polarised on its immediate neighbourhood’ 80

Security preoccupations with Pakistan keep the regional security environment tension-ridden. Although, there is no imminent threat of war, yet the Indian forces have got to be in a state of near-warlike readiness on the borders. On the other side, there is growing feeling among the strategic community in and outside India, that with India taking up a wider/global role a comprehensive and major defence and strategic debate must be initiated without which it is thought ‘India may well miss the opportunity of playing a leadership role on the international scene.’ 81 Through this debate, it is said India should ‘rethink its fundamental security doctrine and planning’ 82 and while moving ahead on the road of a modern military establishment and force, this debate should set out ‘the purpose, shape and the use of that force.’ 83 For such a major debate to start, India has to have a rather tension-free atmosphere which it cannot have while remaining embroiled in Kashmir and, therefore, preoccupied with Pakistan.’84

And, ‘instability’ being a constraint is quite understandable. Economic costs, political uncertainty and diplomatic embarrassment all go together with ‘instability’, which makes it a serious constraint in exercising wider role and influence.

2.1.2) A Closer Look at the Constraints: Kashmir a Crucial Factor

Let us now take a closer look at the two constraints mentioned above. It will turn out that Kashmir- the issue, the movement, the situation — is one of the important factors — indeed a crucial one — behind both the constraints, namely, India’s subcontinental security preoccupations as well as internal ‘instability’. The factor of Kashmir operates in its two dimensions, namely historical and Islamic.

2.1.2.1) Kashmir Factor — Historical Dimension

Kashmir is the main factor which makes Indian politics and it security outlook Pakistan centred or even Pakistan-determined. However, this needs to be properly understood, for it could otherwise suggest that Kashmir is the basic cause of India’s hostility towards Pakistan and Pakistan poses a real security threat to India

Both of which are not true. First, Kashmir is not a cause, it is a consequence of Hindu elite mind’s blind refusal to accept a sovereign Muslim presence in South Asian subcontinent. Grabbing Kashmir in 1947 through a well-planned design and scheme, was part of a determined bid by the Indian Hindu elites to defeat the establishment of Pakistan (which was emerging as a sovereign Muslim presence) as a viable entity after they had failed to defeat its creation in the first place85. Second, Pakistan is not a threat to India’s security in any real sense of the term. All the political analysts agree on this.86 Then what is this security preoccupation with Pakistan and that also through Kashmir? The answer lies in the fact that Kashmir issue places subcontinental politics back in pre-47 context. Operating within that context the Hindu leadership views a live Kashmir issue as a continuation of the Muslim claim on the ‘Mother India’ (the territory under erstwhile British Indian Empire)87 , a claim that had earlier succeeded in ‘extracting’ Pakistan from the ‘Mother’ in 1947. This is no exaggeration to say that the ruling Hindu elites are still not reconciled to the very existence of Pakistan.88 However, one could presume that for some reason or the other the Hindu leadership would agree to tolerate its Muslim neighbour and thus overcome its pre-occupations with it, but Kashmir issue in its live form (i.e not resolved, not frozen) — and for the past seven years it has been more than just live– in an aggressive form — works as an electrifying impulse on the Hindu mind, destabilising it and making it more and more preoccupied with its immediate neighbour Pakistan. So this way Kashmir lies at the centre of the first constraint, namely India’s security preoccupations on the subcontinent. Likewise, Kashmir lies at the centre of another constraint namely internal ‘instability’. Let us see how? There are numerous divisions and tensions found in India on caste, religious-cultural, linguistic, regional and tribal lines. These tensions constitute the potential conflicts and threaten the ‘stability’ of the Indian state. All these conflicts are not current, they are historical, most of them rooted in the genesis of present Indian nation-state— a process during which Gandhi very cunningly managed to carve out an artificial pan-Indian identity at the cost of a number of real identities based on caste, religion, region, language etc. etc. . This is a historical fact that for a considerable period of time after independence in 1947, Indian ruling elites, on a priority basis worked on devising ways and means to neutralize conflicts and thus overcome ‘instability’ that was inbuilt into the Indian nation-state borne in 1947.89 In fact, this process is still on.90 Kashmir in its historical dimension, takes the political debate back to the point in history when sub-continent was going to be politically reorganised consequent to the end of British rule. Since this reorganization when it came about was highly inequitable— a tiny minority of educated westernised Hindus, mostly Brahmins grabbing a major chunk of territory (after unsuccessfully trying hard to grab the whole sub-continent) now known as India— it created more problems than it solved. The question of the future of so many nationalities remained unresolved. A live Kashmir issue brings into sharp focus the inequitable nature and hence the non-finality of 1947 settlement, by raising the question of the political future of Kashmir that is yet to be decided. Now since India has forcibly occupied Kashmir and, therefore, it happens to be a de facto part of India, such a message emanating from a ‘part’ sends highly ‘destabilising’ impulses throughout the whole of India. It may not turn them into full-fledged liberation movements but it definitely aggravates the already existing tensions and potential conflicts in India. The process of growing social cleavages and the vivisection around the question of identities in India and the 1996 general elections being reflective of this process has been noted by Indian political scientists. They have noted this significant development also that political parties and groups in India are becoming the representatives of social classes,91 and this is a prelude to ‘separatism’. How much these developments are influenced by the movement and the issue of Kashmir needs to be properly worked out on the basis of objective research. At the moment, to my knowledge, such a research study does not exist, but that does not constitute a reason for me not to link the ongoing social change in India to the inherent ‘destabilising’ potential of Kashmir issue. So it is this way that Kashmir lies at the centre of another constraining factor namely ‘instability’. Again, instability in India creates more and more regional preoccupations particularly with Pakistan. The more instabilities there are, the more is the Indian ruling elites’ mind preoccupied with Pakistan.

2.1.2.2) Kashmir Factor— The Islamic Dimension

A very basic truth to know about the Indian nation-state is that its underlying nationalist thought is based on a key-perception that there was a Hindu Golden age in ancient times and it is Muslims who disrupted it. The Indian ‘freedom’ movement meant for its initiator Gandhi a return to the golden age of ‘Ram Rajya’92 (‘Ram Rajya’ means ‘The rule of Ram’– a name given by some Hindus to one of their chief gods). And when in 1947, the Muslims of north-western and far eastern parts of the sub-continent got their sovereign home land, it confirmed the fear of Hindu elites that Islam stood in the way of their dreams: Muslims defeated their plans to grab the whole subcontinent. The ruling Hindu elites of India regard Islam as a disruptive force, both, historically as well as geo-politically. They not only hate it, they are equally terrified by it. They cannot look at Islam except as a threat. So far, this threat was perceived to be external— in the form of Pakistan, and internal— in he form of massive Muslim population inside India, but now, in the global Islamic activism, India sees a ‘transnational’ form of this threat also, emerging from every part of the world and closing in on India itself (cf. 1.4.4.1 and fn. 70 below). This active ‘transnational threat’ activates the dormant ‘internal threat’ and in this process of activation the Hindu elites see the hand of the ‘external threat’ (i.e Muslim neighbours Pakistan and Bangladesh). The circuit is complete, but again Kashmir works as the exacerbating factor. Kashmir being the theatre of activism, becomes the focus for Islamic forces world-wide to converge on, and the defiant mood (i.e Muslim youth up in arms) there easily captures the young Muslim minds throughout India. Thus Kashmir in its Islamic dimension exacerbates India’s ‘internal Islamic threat’. It aggravates a factor considered to be the most volatile factor in the ‘stability’ of Indian State— the Muslim factor. This substantially contributes to India’s ‘instability’ and greater the fears of ‘instability’ greater remains India’s preoccupation with its Muslim neighbours.

3) India’s Attempts to Overcome the Constraints

As is understandable, there is growing awareness in India — in ruling circles as well as others — about the factors that act as constraints on India’s NWO role. The point to be noted is, that the two constraints we talked about are quite real; India cannot wish them away. ‘Instability’ is such a constraint that it can even offset India’s economic successes, so vital to India’s emerging role. Shekhar Gupta has given some details of the economic and other costs that India had to incur because of its involvement in Kashmir, Punjab, and North East.93 But overcoming these constraints does not need awareness only; it needs efforts as well. If India thinks it can deal with the rest of the world adopting a policy of ‘neglect of the regional irritants’94 the ‘irritants’ should be in the first place worth neglecting.

3.1) A Pro-Active Approach in the Neighbourhood

There have been serious suggestions coming from the strategic thinkers that India should shed its ‘traditional obsession with Pakistan’ and not link its relations with great powers ‘particularly the U.S, to its problems with Pakistan.’95 The Indian foreign minister Inder Kumar Gujral recently announced a proactive policy towards Pakistan. The crux of this policy is to ‘dump the old insistence on reciprocity and to strike out afresh with unilateral offers to Islamabad.’96 Following this policy India has stopped reacting to each and every anti-India statement or action by Pakistan, as according to analysts this ‘psychopathic obsession with Pakistan makes our neighbour much taller than it actually is; delinked from that obsession.’97 This policy move by India is highly significant and reflects very clearly how determined India is to take on the wider/global role and, accordingly, how keen it is to identify and remove the constraints in this way. It is not just a tactical move; foreign policy analysts view this proactive approach ‘as a conceptual breakthrough with regard to Pakistan’ and they believe that the old policy of an eye-for-eye with Pakistan, ‘in retrospect appears rather foolish.’ 98 The former foreign secretary of India J.N Dixit called it a ‘shift in our policy.’99 The Indian position on all core issues of dispute between India and Pakistan has further hardened and the ‘unilateral offers to Islamabad’ under the new policy will be those concerning trivial matters like, for example the number of staff in the embassies, visa procedures etc. etc. Similar will be the case with other ‘small’ neighbours. For example, I.K Gujral’s recent visit to Bangladesh was very much illustrative of India’s proactive approach. Gujral played down bilateral contentious issues, gave rich verbal assurances to its neighbour and when the B.B.C correspondent in Calcutta, Sudhir Bhoomik was asked what Gujral got back for India in lieu of all these assurances, Bhoomik replied that the minister had secured its neighbour’s support for India’s stand on CTBT and for its bid to seek a permanent seat at the U.N Security Council.100 So without getting entangled into the small neighbour’s ‘small agenda’, India is advancing its own ‘big agenda’.

3.2) Highlighting the Issue of ‘Instability’

Regarding the other more serious constraint namely that of ‘instability’, it was the former Indian Prime Minister Rao who first took it up as a serious issue sensing its implications for India’s emerging role. Rao characterised the freedom movement in Kashmir as one of the kind that threatens the ‘stability’ of the modern nation-state in general. This way Rao struck a common chord with the key players in the NWO, as it conforms very well with the general security and strategic outlook of the NWO i.e the main source of threat in the world being conflicts not between but within the states (cf.1.1.4.3). Kashmir, with its Islamic dimension (cf. 2.1.2.2) fitted well in Rao’s characterization and the so-called world community looked at India’s case as a typical instance of ‘Islam threatening the stability of key states in the NWO’ (cf.1.1.4.3). This explains the concerns of Russia and China—key states in NWO— about India’s ‘stability’. When Rao visited Moscow after Boris Yeltsin’s India visit in 1992, the ‘shared concern for the stability and survival of multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic societies’101 found a prominent place in the joint declaration. The Chinese ambassador to India while addressing a press conference in Calcutta in April 1994 stated Beijing’s intention to formally accept Sikkim’s accession to India102 and also said that ‘there was no question of China backing any insurgencies in India in future.’103 Before this China used to bitterly contest Sikkim’s accession, but now it was the question of ‘stability’: If China could help India , India could in turn come to China’s help who equally finds ‘stability’ threatened by a sizeable Muslim presence there.

4) India’s Needs and U.S’s Wants: The Context of Indo-U.S Convergence on Kashmir

From what was said at (2.1.2) it should be clear that Kashmir is crucially and singularly important in deciding the question that whether India can overcome the above mentioned constraints or not. How can India afford the ‘neglect of regional irritants’ in its dealings with neighbours or the world at large, while Indian occupation continues to be challenged in Kashmir and it continues to be a live issue? Kashmir factor cannot be ignored by India in its overall scheme of overcoming the constraints that restrain its capability to take up a wider/global role. But at the same time India is not in a position- it never was – to neutralize this factor to the extent that it ceases to operate in a way it does now vis-a-vis the two constraining factors (cf. 2.1.2). For this to happen i.e Kashmir ceasing to be an exacerbating factor in India’s regional security preoccupations and its potential ‘instability’, what is needed India alone cannot deliver and what India can deliver that alone will not suffice. Here lies the crux of the matter: indispensability of U.S rescue effort to rid India of the constraints by helping it in Kashmir.

4.1) India’s Predicament

In real terms, there is little India alone can do to neutralize the Kashmir factor. Kashmir is not a recent problem, it has been there since 1947 and India has been dealing with it one way or the other , with only short term ‘benefits’ but no long term ‘gain’. (India’s past and present dealing of Kashmir will be sketched in some more detail at (5)). To start with, in 1947 it brought in Sheikh Abdullah, arrested him in 1953 after which a chain of proxy governments followed. Then after concluding that Sheikh was after all the ‘best’ bet, India entered into negotiations with Sheikh and a deal was made according to which Sheikh Abdullah was brought back to power in 1974. This arrangement continued, with Sheikh Abdullah’s son, Dr Farooq taking over after former’s death. Then in 1989, with the emergence of present movement everything was torn asunder: no government, no Sheikhs, nobody to ‘take care’ of India in Kashmir. With slight differences, the situation was back to square one i.e 1947. Now, this time again India can repeat what it used to do: after what India calls crushing the militancy by sheer brute military force it will install a government and that is nothing new. India just has to wait for a day when this arrangement also like the previous ones goes off and India again finds itself in the predicament to ‘start’ dealing with Kashmir.

This is a futile game and Indian leaders now also realize this. They realize that if they want to eliminate the Kashmir factor— which they have to— attempts at changing the situation in Kashmir alone, though necessary, will not suffice; something more has to be done, mainly Pakistan has to be brought around. 1974 Indira-Sheikh accord was disapproved by Pakistan and results are for anyone to see.104 Remaining determined not to give up Kashmir (which could really resolve the issue) the Hindu ruling elites want a kind of ‘solution’ or ‘settlement’ or ‘peace plan’ that takes care of Kashmir for ever: the problem does not erupt again and again and, more importantly, it ceases to be an issue altogether. This is not possible without a ‘comprehensive settlement’ involving Pakistan and, of course, Kashmir. This ‘settlement’ is a vital need of India, political as well as economic but at the same time India by itself cannot bring it about. It is not possible for India to grab Kashmir and then, on its own, make Pakistan toe its line, neither is it possible for India to change the situation in Kashmir beyond a point. The only viable instrument available to India for manoeuvre in Kashmir is National Conference, but that leaves much of the political spectrum, indeed the major part of it, beyond the reach of direct Indian influence. More important than that, from 1989 onwards the freedom movement in Kashmir had almost monopolized the political space and the openly pro-India forces felt suffocated, there being no room for them to operate or manoeuvre.105 Although things have been changing recently , yet the degree to which the pro-India forces in Kashmir are capable of manoeuvre still depends on how much the freedom movement there, allows it.

U.S has an influence on Pakistan, and the present freedom movement in Kashmir, particularly its political leadership has been favourably inclined to the West. This places U.S in a unique position where India is left with no other option but to seek its help since U.S influence can work, where India’s cannot and where it is needed most.

4.2) U.S Interest

Now, looking from the other side, U.S too wants a ‘comprehensive settlement’ in the region involving India, Pakistan, Kashmir and may be some more with its own interest and ultimate objectives in mind. U.S interest is not Kashmir as such; it has basically strategic interests in the wider Asian region. U.S interest demands a strong, ‘stable’ and market-democratic India and the whole purpose of a comprehensive settlement for U.S is to formalise some kind of a regional security structure in the South Asian region in which the existing power realities in the region are formalised giving India predominance in the region and legitimatizing Pakistan’s subservience; the ‘instability’ factors — Kashmir on top of them — are neutralised, enabling India to ‘rise above’ subcontinental security preoccupations and play a ‘useful’ role in the BoP regime in Asia. There is already some talk of such a ‘settlement’ making rounds in some responsible quarters in U.S strategic community. Reports appearing in Indian and Pakistani press say that Dr Stephen Cohen, an informal consultant to U.S State Dept. has circulated a ‘blue-print’ for a South Asian Camp David plan among very responsible and influential Congressional circles in U.S.106 We should, however, evaluate the prospect of such a ‘settlement’ not on the basis of Cohen proposals or the denials of it by other responsible U.S officials,107 but on the basis of the strategic logic of the evolving international system in Asia (cf.1.3). This system cannot evolve and become functional, without such a ‘settlement’ being worked out in the first place. The reason:

It was basically in 1947, that an India-dominated political order was established in South Asia. Since then things have changed in India’s favour. India has added to its power and it has no serious challenges left to its position in the immediate region. India is thus ‘in a unique position amongst large Asian powers since all of the others potentially confront serious challenges to their regional positions.108 On the one hand India is really in a dominating position, but on the other almost all its neighbours are scared of its hegemonic intentions and, therefore, not ready to accept its leadership. Pakistan has openly challenged it. This is seen by the strategic community as ‘weakening of the ‘natural’ regional security structure in South Asia.109 A ‘natural’ structure was established by the British with India in the leadership position and everyone else expected to accept this leadership, but it has not worked. So the ‘natural’ arrangement needs to be formalised now. Here comes the need of a ‘comprehensive settlement’ talked about above. What will be the form of this ‘comprehensive settlement’ or the South Asian ‘Camp David’ is too early to say. However, a few general but important points can be made on the basis of some facts.

• (a) It was during U.S defence secretary William Perry’s visit last year (cf.1.4.4.1) that the then Indian PM Rao in a meeting with the former agreed to the offer of U.S playing a role in the ‘solution of Kashmir issue.’110 The offer having come at Perry’s visit and that being accepted by India, suggests strategic-security considerations to be the main element in U.S South Asia moves.

• (b) The U.S Kashmir activism has been widely noticed in the recent days mainly with reference to U.S Ambassador to India Frank Wisner’s ‘shuttle diplomacy’ — frequent air jaunts to Islamabad, Srinagar and top level discussions with all ‘concerned’ everywhere. One can argue that why the U.S ambassador in India and not the one in Pakistan or for that matter any ‘neutral’ U.S diplomat has been entrusted with the Kashmir task. The answer may perhaps lie in the fact that U.S South Asia moves are India-centred.

• (c) The US Institute of Peace (USIP)— a think tank of the U.S State Dept.— has been holding some regular annual meetings about Kashmir. In its Jan 1994 meeting, the concept paper circulated, categorically stated that the ‘resolution of the conflict in Kashmir could be attempted only within the existing political framework of the subcontinent.’111 and this according to an Indian participant in the meeting ‘lent an air of reality to the discussions.’112 This gives some indication that Kashmir’s secession from India is ruled out in U.S South Asia plans, which in turn points to the fact that in these plans India’s ‘stability’ is being taken well care of.

India needs a ‘comprehensive settlement’ as opposed to an ad hoc agreement; U.S is also looking for a comprehensive settlement as part of its overall strategic planning for Asia. This creates a sort of Indo-U.S convergence. Indo-U.S co-operation on Kashmir, for example, U.S support to India for the proposed ‘assembly elections’ in Kashmir should be seen against the backdrop of this convergence. A U.S South Asia/Kashmir move which apparently looks pro-India should not be merely viewed as such; it may be helping India but at the same time it may be necessitated by the wider U.S strategic outlook for Asia.

5) India’s Present Moves in Kashmir: 
A Proper Understanding of the Game

India’s current moves in Kashmir are basically directed at strengthening its otherwise deteriorating position there. As with all other disputes anywhere in the world, Kashmir always serves as a barometric index reflecting the current state of power relations obtaining between the rival parties in the dispute. India cannot afford to have great power claims and missile-power projections and yet remain wounded and humbled inside Kashmir. Such a position of India defies the logic of the ‘comprehensive settlement’ (cf. 4.2) legitimising India’s dominance in the region. Kashmir is all important when it comes to the question of India’s and Pakistan’s regional positions vis-à-vis each other, and stronger the movement in Kashmir against Indian occupation, stronger becomes the strategic edge of Pakistan over India. This is just the inescapable logic of the regional geo-strategic and historical realities. So if India is to be freed of the constraints and its predominance to be institutionalised then its deteriorating position in Kashmir has to be strengthened accordingly; it is an integral and at the moment the most crucial step in that direction. It is, therefore, no surprise that the U.S support for India’s current Kashmir moves (e.g elections, India promising ‘internal autonomy’ for Kashmir etc. etc. ) precisely amounts to that: it strengthens India’s position. How it does, can be better understood if we look at how India has, right from its occupation of Kashmir, sought to build up and consolidate its position in Kashmir and how in that scheme of things U.S support proves crucially helpful.

5.1) India’s Method of Entrenching Itself in Kashmir

India has been following a very careful and considered policy to entrench itself in Kashmir. India’s grab of Kashmir, in the first place was also very carefully planned and with definite designs, short and long- term interests. India has been working in two spheres to bring about change and to ‘strengthen’ its position in Kashmir. One- inside Kashmir ; two-in the geo- strategic environment of Kashmir. The emphasis has been on change inside Kashmir. The break-up of Pakistan in 1971, was a change in the geo-strategic environment of Kashmir; it had a definite impact on the situation in Kashmir, the most visible being the disbanding of all Jammu & Kashmir plebiscite front- a powerful organisation calling for plebiscite to ascertain the political future of Jammu & Kashmir. India had , in fact written of Kashmir issue in 1971 thinking that it had succeeded in hitting at the very focus of the freedom movement in Kashmir i.e Pakistan.

5.1.1) Creation of a Proxy Political System

India has sought to strengthen its position inside Kashmir primarily on the basis of military force. However, in the game of durable control over Kashmir, creating a proxy political system by sheer manipulation has been a priority with Hindu ruling elites of India. They never truly relied on this proxy system but cleverly used it, and there lies the real purpose of this system. They did not rely on this because this system did not constitute, in real terms, an independent source of strength for India in Kashmir. Indian army and intelligence have been the real sources. But, nevertheless this political system has been India’s main source of strength in its dealings with the rest of the world, in particular Pakistan over the question of Kashmir. This is borne out by historical facts. India behaved extremely arrogantly in the early years of its occupation of Kashmir, turned down requests of plebiscite from so many countries and also the proposals put forward by the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP).113 India could afford this rigidity only when it had a viable political instrument in Kashmir in the form of National Conference (NC) and its leader Sheikh Abdullah whom the Hindu leaders had enticed way back in 1930. This had given India a considerable power of manoeuvre in Kashmir and lent an ‘acceptable’ face to its occupation of the Muslim land— an otherwise bizarre act of aggression. Apart from strengthening India politically and diplomatically, this proxy political system in Kashmir was geared to serve a more sinister purpose at home, namely ideological and cultural subversion to ensure full Indian entrenchment. It was through this system that India sought to engineer a change in the thinking, outlook, attitudes, morals, values and beliefs among the general masses of Kashmir. This was done mainly with the aim of undermining the Muslim identity and culture of people so that the real bed-rock of their resistance to Indian occupation could be smashed. All this could not have been attempted through brute armed force alone. NC played a pivotal role in this Indian game and a full account of its role in attempting to transform the ground reality in Kashmir is hitherto not thoroughly investigated and reported. Elsewhere, in a not-so-serious study about the encroachments that Islam in Kashmir was subjected to, by its hostile environment i.e, non-Islam, I have looked at NC in historical terms as representing an instrument of ‘Hinduization of Islam in Kashmir.’114

5.2) Creating a Proxy Political System: ‘Purposes’ in the Present Situation

What India is doing now in Kashmir should be seen in the light of what it has been doing there in the past. India is going to put a ‘political system’ in place using the same old instrument— The NC. For the real control of Kashmir ,India will not rely on this system. It will continue relying on army and other coercive agencies, but nevertheless , this system will have its own ‘purposes’ to achieve and India will use it for those purposes.

5.2.1) First Purpose: Subversion

The first purpose of proxy political system is subversion. As mentioned above , this has been one of the main purposes of this system in Kashmir. However, this time the purpose and the process of subversion has been to be seen in the context of the situation created by the present freedom movement in Kashmir. When the present freedom movement started in 1989, India initiated a military process with Armed Forces as the instrument to crush it . But, as was expected , it has been only able to partially contain it. Now, with the old process still on, India is initiating a new i.e. political process with NC (instead of Armed Forces) as the instrument to subvert and totally eliminate the freedom movement. This is because of a universally accepted principle that militarily an armed guerrilla movement can only be contained, not eliminated; elimination is achieved politically. Looked this way, reinstatement of NC in Kashmir can be a beginning of the beginning. With its coming to power , a process of subversion will start. NC will serve as a magnet for all the evil and filth of Kashmir. The selfish and the politically ambitious elements— new and old— will join together into a sort of a counter ‘movement’ with NC in the vanguard to discredit the freedom movement and all that goes with it.

5.2.2) Second Purpose: Providing a Democratic Face

Second purpose of the proxy political system that used to be an important purpose in the past was to provide an ‘acceptable’ face to India’s presence in Kashmir. In the present circumstances, it would also mean that an ‘elected government’ will serve as a democratic facade for India to continue with its militaristic agenda in Kashmir. Some people think this to be the main purpose of India’s political exercise in Kashmir. However, we take the view here that this has not remained a very important purpose, now, for two reasons: First, in the changed global situation India can, without any democratic pretensions, ‘justify’

its ruthless military actions openly on the basis of its ‘national security’ demands. In fact, India wants to be seen as tough and ruthless, when it comes to the question of ‘national security’ and interest and it has always put Kashmir on top of its ‘national security’ agenda. India’s detailed articulation of its ‘national security’ perception at the recent CTBT deliberations (cf. 1.4.4.1) should be taken quite seriously and as relevant to what is being said here. Second, although in the past the proxy political system in Kashmir almost successfully camouflaged the fact of India being an aggressor there, yet in the recent years, India’s position as an occupationist force stands so exposed before the people of the world at large that no proxy systems in Kashmir can hide it now.

5.2.3) Third Purpose: An Institutional Proxy Presence

The third, and in the present circumstances ,the most important purpose of political exercise in Kashmir has to be seen in the context of India’s political need of having an institutional presence through some sort of ‘legitimate’ entity in the present political spectrum of Kashmir .With the emergence of the present movement, India has been almost politically dislodged from Kashmir. No doubt there have been mischievous elements all along, scattered and working clandestinely with a hidden Indian agenda, but there has not been a formal entity openly active with a declared pro-India program. Now in a final solution of Kashmir when and if it comes to the question of ascertaining the ‘wishes’ of Kashmiri people, India in that event desperately needs an entity in the political arena of Kashmir that can represent exclusive Indian interest. India cannot find a better and a more suitable candidate than NC to fit in the slot. But, NC as a party has been absent from the political scene and India needs to reinstate it first. This is precisely what India is aiming at by declaring the restoration of internal autonomy to Kashmir . India has not spelt out any details of it publicly, but that hardly matters . What is important is that it has given NC something ‘ new ‘ to sell in the political market , and when it is NC with such a new item in its political kit , it is likely to be perceived by people as a step in the forward direction. Struggling in the past seven years with extreme sufferings and torture, people have developed a keen sense of direction and they believe they have moved ahead. They are less likely to be averse to anything, which they perceive somehow to be compatible with their sense of having ‘moved ahead’. It is important to note that the people in Kashmir, at the psychological level relate to NC and APHC (The All Party Hurriet Conference–The political umbrella of the present freedom movement) in two different frames of mind. In the frame of mind , they relate to NC, they look at autonomy or pre-1953 position in relation to the position of 1989, when NC ruled last and pre-53 position being better than 1989 position is perceived as an ‘advance’ which somehow fits into their sense of having ‘moved ahead’. On the other hand, in the frame of mind , people relate to APHC, autonomy is viewed in relation to complete independence from India and the former being decisively low on the scale, is perceived as a climb-down and, therefore, incompatible with the peoples’ sense of having ‘moved ahead’. People will be averse to anything which they perceive as a step backward. Here lies the importance of India’s autonomy declaration for NC. The latter will be reinstated as a political entity through ‘elections’ and thus in any ‘settlement’ where the aspirations of Kashmiri people will have to be ascertained, India will insist on NC to be regarded as the only ‘democratically elected legitimate’ entity. Now, one can also understand why did U.S. and Britain openly support India’s election moves in Kashmir. They knew fully well the destructive potential of the ‘peaceful democratic’ weapon— the elections— for the present freedom movement in Kashmir. They knew it was going to corner the APHC: if APHC participated in elections, they would draw a blank because people would see it as a betrayal; if they boycotted, they will be necessarily yielding the ‘democratic’ political space to NC and thus in practical terms, elections in either case would not mean anything other than the reinstatement of India’s proxy elements in Kashmir, thus substantially strengthening India’s position there. Supporting India’s election moves, therefore, amounted to helping India in the most crucial way— the way it desperately needed to be helped. True, the political space that NC gets through ‘elections’ is illegitimate, but then these are the powers— U.S, Britain etc. etc. who remain at the helm of affairs and become the arbiters in the final ‘solutions’ of our problems, be it Bosnia, Palestine or Kashmir, and who decide on the question of what is legitimate and illegitimate.

6) Conclusions and Recommendation

a) Given the fact that:

India wants to get rid of Kashmir problem instead of resolving it, and The west, particularly U.S is supporting these moves, our main burden in this paper was to investigate what motivates India’s moves and U.S support of it. What emerged after a very detailed discussion, is that the whole Indian exercise and the U.S interest has to be seen against the backdrop of India’s emerging role in the global political order. In the NWO India is emerging as one of the key players with a wider ‘security’ role in the Asian region and this makes it necessary that India be freed of all those immediate regional ‘irritants’ which presently act as constraints on its wider role by keeping it embroiled in its immediate neighbourhood. It also emerged that Kashmir is the main ‘irritant’ and the most crucial factor in exacerbating a host of other factors that give rise to (i) ‘instability’ of Indian State, and (ii) India’s regional ‘security’ preoccupations, particularly with Pakistan—- the two main constraints on India’s emerging role. The most important truth that emerges from the whole discussion is that given the political, economic, strategic and security considerations in the NWO, the West is developing a vested interest in the integrity and stability of India. This leads to an important conclusion that West will not allow Kashmir’s complete independence from India, which in turn leads to yet another inescapable conclusion that a movement for the freedom of Kashmir (in or outside the occupied land) cannot, and, therefore, must not be premised on the support of the West. If it is, it cannot resolve the issue; it can further complicate it and that too at a very high human cost.

b) Towards the end we also looked at India’s present activism in Kashmir—- holding elections, announcing the grant of internal autonomy etc. etc.

It turned out that all these moves are geared towards strengthening the deteriorating position of India in Kashmir through the restoration of NC. What we should basically conclude now is that India has after all succeeded in changing the very field of action in Kashmir. In 1989 the armed freedom movement offered India a field with its own ground-rules; now it is India who is laying out the field. Its ground rules are laid by India and agenda set by it. Some oppose the agenda, some favour it, but all are essentially the players in same field. For example NC contested the elections, APHC opposed them but all shared the same common field—- the field of ‘democratic competition’. This change of field did not come about overnight; it came through a long process, the description of which we deliberately choose to avoid here, although this writer has been a close witness to this process and its known opponent in occupied Kashmir. What needs to be understood is that the new field of action is inherently tilted towards the empowerment of India. Indeed that is precisely the objective for which it has been designed in the first place. The Freedom Movement is necessarily bound to be a casualty in this field. The reason is that although this field is apparently made out to be a field of ‘democratic competition’, yet in reality it is not. The designers of this field give out an impression that things are decided only on the basis of argument and logic. India also goes to the people, APHC also goes and it is upto them i.e the people to decide what to do and what not. There is no force, no coercion. But here exactly lies the trap. Does India engage in a democratic process after disbanding its armed forces? If gun introduces an element of force or coercion into an otherwise field of argument and logic, what about Indian gun? India retains its militancy which it calls armed forces, and calls for the armed force of the freedom movement which it calls militancy, to be ‘crushed’ before a democratic process can begin. So in this field of ‘democratic competition’ India is not only with the gun, all its political activism is on the basis of the gun; on the other hand the freedom movement is not only without the gun, it has to be seen to be opposed to the gun in order to be an acceptable player in this new field. Thus the new field of action by the very nature of its ground rules overwhelmingly favours India and pro-India forces. In such a situation, the long and medium term options for completely defeating the Indian State can be worked out only after a serious re-think. However, in the short term, there are still options for APHC to exercise. Their chief option, the effectivity of which depends on their capability, is the management and manipulation of the military threat that has emanated from the armed movement operating in Kashmir for the past seven years. This is a standard option exercised by all the modern liberation movements and the recent instances where it has been successfully used are the Sinn Fein (the parent political party of Irish Republican army IRA in Northern Ireland) and the African National Congress (ANC). The option works like this: Once an armed movement starts its military operations, three things are demonstrated namely

• (i) Existence of armed group(s),

• (ii) Possession of arms and ammunition by the group(s)

• (iii) Capability and will of the group(s) to hurt enemy targets and interests. These three things create a threat, which the enemy, under no circumstances, affords to write-off even if the actual use of force is suspended. In inter-state relations also, the hostile states never ignore each other’s threat even if they are on peaceful terms. In case of guerrilla armed movements however, the threat is taken more seriously by the enemy because unlike regular armed forces of the states, the force levels of an armed movement remain secret—- not being documented in military journals or monitored by institutions and agencies. Based on the logic that an armed movement can never be fully eliminated, its threat always persists until the problem (which had given rise to the movement) is politically resolved. This places the political managers of the liberation movement always in a position to constantly manage and manipulate the threat to the best of their advantage. This option is still available to APHC. The crucial factor is their political skill but more than that their seriousness of intentions and will i.e How serious and determined are they to defeat India? This option is otherwise there for APHC to exercise to the best advantage of Kashmiri people and the movement.

c) In the course of discussion, it also turned out that it is basically Pakistan which has made India to remain preoccupied in its immediate vicinity. It may not be so much due to the policies of Pakistan as due to its mere existence. This may lead one to conclude that Pakistan has a crucial role to play in the emerging political-strategic scenario in South Asia. Historically, Pakistan symbolises a clear defiance of the Hindu hegemony over post-British South Asia. In its essence Pakistan movement, in a wider sense, represented a way to a dignified post-colonial future not only for Muslims of South Asia but for all other distinct nationalities of the region as well. These nationalities like Sikhs and Dalits for example also struggled in their own ways, but it was for some definite reasons that Muslims alone could succeed, at least to a considerable extent. However, the temporary failure of these nationalities in pre-47 period, does not mean that they are for ever destined to be the slaves of Brahmins or other ‘high caste’ Hindu elites nor does it mean that Pakistan should cease to be the vanguard of the movement for the emancipation of all these deprived communities. True, Pakistan is too weak to shoulder such great responsibilities. A strong and fully autonomous state has yet to develop in Pakistan. Right from the intellectual to the common man the question that is very often asked in Pakistan is, “who governs this God-given country?” But whatever the reality, the fact remains that the historical and geo-strategic position in which Pakistan exists, there is no substitute to it. Pakistan has to be made to deliver what it does not or cannot at the moment, but what history has chosen it for. For this to happen many an efforts are needed. One, for example, is that the political agenda and discourse in Pakistan should develop on very substantial basis along specific lines and around vital and important themes.

d) An important point that emerged from the discussion is that the ruling Hindu elites in India have a strong animus against Islam. This is something Muslims world-wide, particularly those struggling for the political goals of Islam should take a serious note of. Moreover, in this regard Iran has to be very careful about its relations with India. The most important thing is that Iran should have a very clear and correct view of the reality that India represents. It should be very clear about its core objectives and interests in its relationship with India and should have a very clear view of the scope and the limitations of this relationship. For example Iran should never look at this relationship as a strategic tie-up against U.S. There is absolutely no reason to think so. As to India, it is very clear-minded about its relation with Iran. Its chief interest is to isolate Pakistan and gain access into Central Asia, where its cultural and economic interests are considered to be ‘very substantial’ and with which Tehran provides a ‘vital link.’115 Iran should, by word and deed, show a strong contempt for India’s great power ambitions, and it should be seen as such by the people of the world, particularly Muslims. India’s recent stand on CTBT was not an act of defiance against U.S, but a strong assertion of its ‘great power’ ambition. The whole bogey of global disarmament was an exercise in sheer hypocrisy, which should have been rejected by Islamic Iran with the contempt that it deserved.

NOTES and References

1. Chomsky (1994) p 271

2. The ‘South Commission’ comprised of scientists, economists, government planners and religious leaders from 26 countries representing all the continents of the South (i.e the ‘developing world’). The Commission was formally set-up in 1987 on the initiative of Mahatir Mohammed, the Prime Minister of Malaysia who came to Dare-Salam to meet Julius K Nyerere, the ex-president of Tanzania and announced in the summit of non-aligned movement, held in Harare in 1986, the intention to establish ‘South Commission’ under Nyerere’s chairmanship. Dr Man Mohan Singh who later became the finance minister of India to initiate pro-market ‘reforms’, was the Commission’s general secretary. The Commission in its final publication noted ‘the issue for the South is not whether to cut its links with the North, but how to transform them. The relationship must be changed from exploitation to shared benefit, from subordination to partnership’ see South Commission (1990), pp 211-12

3. See for example Paul Dibb (1995) p 6. Granted that material resources are a means to power and position, the point that needs to be worked out in some more depth is what do those —individuals or nations— seeking power and dominance ultimately aspire for? What is the ultimate objective they want to achieve? The Noble Quran introduces Pharoah as an epitome of overwhelming political power and lust for dominance. At the height of his power Pharoah calls his people and proclaims ‘Am I not your Lord, most High’ (Quran: 79:23-24). At another place he again proclaims among his people ‘O my people, does not the dominion of Egypt belong to me, (witness) these streams flowing underneath my palace” (43:51). It appears as if the ultimate objective of those seeking dominance is to have the intoxicating feeling of absolute powerfulness, of absolute control over their domains. May be this intoxication is the ultimate ‘prize’ that the dominance-seekers aspire for, more than the real power and control that they actually happen to possess.

4. See ‘The International Order—Situation, Mission, Execution’, the Economist 
Dec 24, 1994 – Jan 6, 1995 pp17-20. 
The Economist generally regarded as an authentic source reflecting the West’s mindset, builds up a ‘strong’ case for ‘spreading democracy’ giving a host of ‘reasons’ which it calls ‘solid reasons’ and on the basis of which it concludes: …’that non-imperialist project, the spreading of empire of democracy, will remain on Western agenda’. An important point needs to be made about the spread of democracy by the West. It is often said that West has no commitment to democracy, it is just a matter of interest; West supports democracy where it suits it, and opposes the same where it does not. I do not believe it to be true and I hold that West has a commitment as well as a fanatic zeal for democracy, but what the West means by democracy needs to be properly understood. Secularism, which is at the root of democracy, is essentially a creed of denial. For a secular man what is denied is a matter of principle, what is asserted is a matter of tactic. Democracy denies the rule of the Divine; instead it asserts the rule of the people. In the meaning of democracy the component of denial is a matter of principle for the secular man; that of assertion a matter of tactic. By this logic, in the case of Muslim world, West’s commitment to democracy means denying Islam any and every chance to rule. This being the component of denial, i.e Islam will not rule, West is in principle committed to it. As to the component of assertion, i.e who will rule, who will displace Islam and keep it from ruling— a people’s government or a king’s regime, it is just a matter of what suits West’s interest at a particular time. In the case of non-Muslim societies democracy as a principle has no ‘meaning’ for the West. The cardinal principle of democracy— denying the rule of the Divine— does not apply there. It then remains the question of pure interest whether to support peoples’ elected governments or other types of regimes.

5. See Chomsky (op cit) p179.

6. G-71/2 is Flora Lewis’s coinage. See Lewis (1991-2) pp 25-40.

7. See Kirton (1993) p 337. This is a well argued-out discussion about gradual emergence of G-7 as the main institution for managing the global political and security agenda.

8. See Lewis (op cit) pp 25-26, also cited in Kirton (op cit) p 337. The main thing to be understood here, is, that although G-7 does not pass binding resolutions as the U.N Security Council does, yet it, i.e G-7 does something more fundamental. As Kirton argues, it takes the lead in international agenda-setting by immediately taking up and giving prominence to new issues, defining them, establishing new issue areas by legitimising linkages (for example trade and environment). Thus, for example, ‘terrorism’ came up as a ‘new issue’ in 1980 after the revolutionary take over of U.S embassy in Tehran, and from 1990 East-West relations disappeared and transformation of international order became the focus. It is after the ‘issues’ have been established in the first place, the U.N Security Council takes up the matter of resolutions, sanctions and other types of actions.

9. For a fuller discussion of these issues see Dewit, D. et al (eds) (1993)

10. See Peter Ackerman (1993) pp 34-35

11. See M.K Zuckerman ‘U.S administration labels cybersecurity plan ‘urgent” The Times of India, New Delhi, July 23, 1996

12. According to The Economist (op cit): “The World of 1990s still contains plenty of non-democratic governments, but except in the murkier corners of Islam it contains very few people seriously willing to argue that democracy is not the most satisfactory way of running a country.” p 18

13. See Rotfeld (1995) pp.3-4

14. See Kirton (op cit) p354. Kirton has classified security agenda of post-45 international order into what he calls old, new and emerging security threats. About new and emerging threats he says that they are non-military in character in the sense that armed force plays a minimal role. About emerging threats he makes an interesting observation: they currently constitute a threat not to human life itself but to other national values (e.g economic prosperity, international competitiveness, plant and animal life, historic, social and linguistic balances)’ p 341

15. Henry Kissinger (1994) p 809

16. Kirton (op cit) has enumerated four concert characteristics and he says G-7 has all of them. This he says has ‘increased its institutional depth, policy breadth and authoritative reach.’ p 355

17. Flora Lewis (op cit), says this about G-71/2 , p 26

18. Kissinger (op cit) p 23

19. Bill Clinton’s UN speech on Sept 27, 1993. Cited in Ibid p 805

20. See Stuart and Row (1995) p 12

21. Anthony Lake, National Security adviser to Clinton, articulating more clearly Clinton’s ‘enlargement’ concept. Cited in Ibid p 12

22. George Bush’s UN speech on Oct 1, 1990. Cited in Kissinger (op cit) p 804

23. Ibid

24. Stuart and Row (op cit) pp 12-13

25. Recently G-7 issued a 25-point program to combat ‘terrorism’.

26. See John Hooper ‘Europe fishes in the Mediterranean’. The Guardian Nov 25, 1996

27. Spanish vice-president of the European Commission, Manuel Marin, talking to John Hooper of The Guardian. Cited in Ibid.

28. For the full deliberations of the conference see Conference Papers (1993) Part I and II.

29. See for example, Acharya (1993), Dannreuther (1994), Nevers (1994), Sasae (1994),Thayer (1995), (in addition to other IISS papers cited elsewhere in this study).

30. This is Paul Dibb’s proposal. See Dibb (op cit) p.6 Prof. Paul Dibb is Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the Australian National University, Canberra.

31. Paul Dibb has specified the major powers to emerge in the Asian regional order, but middle powers to participate in the system, he has left unspecified. However in the region ‘Asia’ under his consideration he has classified various powers as Great, Middle and Small powers. India is classified as great, Pakistan as middle and Sri Lanka as small. See Dibb (op cit) p.74 fn 6 to ‘Introduction’
From what was said at (1.2.2) above, one can safely assume that the middle powers to participate as active players in the Asian international system need to be ‘market democracies’ which in substance means their being believers in the religion of money and their having a strong will to fight Islam at all costs.

32. Kissinger (op cit) p 21

33. Ibid. p 21

34. Stuart & Row (op cit) p 27

35. Dibb (op cit) p 52

36. Ibid p 34

37. Ibid p 71

38. Kissinger (op cit) p 826

39. Ibid p 806, also Ackerman (op cit) p 32. Ackerman has given a concise but very insightful analysis of the relation between economic and security issues and has convincingly shown why economic and security policies defy integration.

40. The U.S Secretary of State Warren Christopher said on 17th Nov 1993 in Seattle, Washington, “Asia has asked us to remain engaged in the region, and we will do so. But for the American people to appreciate the benefits of such an engagement, Asia’s markets must be opened to our goods and services.’ See Dibb (op cit) fn 48 to Ch.IV

41. China and Russia along with Kazakhistan recently concluded an agreement to jointly contain Islam in the region. Behind the considerable thaw in Sino-Indian relations containing Islam is the key element, as this thaw, significantly, followed improved Indo-U.S relations. This significance has been noted by Raju Thomas (1993) pp 12-13.

42. See Dibb (op cit) p 53

43. Gupta (1995) fn 7 to Ch. 1

44. Jeff Choudry ‘India: Too Big to Ignore’ Proffessional Investor Aug.1996 pp 14-17.

45. Ibid

46. Gupta (op cit) p 60

47. Ramesh Chandran ‘Anti-India Dan Burton Amendment is defeated’ The Times of India, New Delhi June 7, 1996

48. The Economist, July 6 -12, 1996 ‘Ship me somewhere East of Wapping.’ p.90.

49. Gupta (op cit) fn 6 to Ch. 1

50. Choudry (op cit) p 19

51. Damani’s Interview of May, 1996 in Professional Investor Aug 1, 1996 p.18

52. Gupta (op cit) p 12 and fn 9 to Ch. 1

53. Ibid p 13

54. Ramesh Chandran (op cit). Chandran was reporting on the defeat of an ‘anti-India’ bill brought fourth by Indiana Republican Dan Burton on 5th June seeking a cut in U.S aid to India because of the human rights violations in Kashmir. As Chandran reported ‘the voting was conspicuous with the spirited lobbying by some top corporate houses in America.’

55. See The Economist (op cit). ‘Ship me….’ 
56. Ibid 
57. BBC Radio broadcast. Friday, August 16th program ‘Connections’ 
58. BBC Radio broadcast. Friday, August 28th program ‘Connections’ 
59. Cohen (1993) p 92 
60. See Dibb (op cit) p 34, Kissinger (op cit) p 26, Thomas (1993a) p 71 
61. ‘U.S ‘committed’ to stable ties with India.’ The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, May 18, 1996 
62. See ‘Special Survey: India And the European Union. ‘India Today, June 30,1996 p97
63. Commenting on a proposed position paper EC was preparing about India, special secretary, external relations, external affairs ministry of India and till March India’s ambassador to EU in Brussels A N Ram said ‘The idea of this paper is to bring India into the European scheme of things’. See Ibid p 99 Indian strategic community has always been for deepening of defence relations with U.S. They have been working out how ‘best’ to serve the oppressive order. Take for example these thoughts: ‘Located east of Iran, West of China and South of Central Asia and Afghan region, India is a nation in which the West should have vital stakes’ see Gupta (op cit) p 65 
64. John Cherian ‘ The American Agenda: The visits by William Perry and Ronald Brown.’ Frontline Feb 10, 1995 p 120 
65. Reported by Atul Aneja ‘Pact with U.S opens door for Global Role.’ The Hindu New Delhi, Jan 31, 1995 
66. John Cherian (op cit) 
67. This is former Indian foreign secretary M Rasgotra commenting on U.S defence secretary’s visit. See M Rasgotra ‘Security, environment— India’s vital interests’ The Hindustan Times New Delhi, Jan 23, 1995 
68. See Indian Ambassador to Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) Arundhati Ghose’s statement at the CD plenary ‘India’s stand on CTBT.’ The Times of India New Delhi , June 21, 1996 Earlier, on June 12, the leading Indian defence analyst K Subrahmanyam had rather frankly suggested that India should come out with the real reason i.e national security for not signing the CTBT. This, he said was the real reason behind not signing the NPT also. Quite interestingly, Subrahmanyam opined that there is an influential section in U.S who are opposed to CTBT ‘and it is not unlikely that they would like to wreck the treaty if they can make India a convenient scapegoat.’ See K Subrahmanyam ‘Banning Nuclear Tests: Hard decisions in the making.’ The Times of India, New Delhi June 12, 1996 
69. First Leader ‘Moment of truth’ The Times of India, June 21, 1996 
70. Thomas while analysing India’s new security enviroment: “The most important change has been the emergence of a new but as yet vague ‘Islamic threat’— an indeterminate complex mix of ‘external’, ‘internal’, and ‘transnational’ threats. The main external component of the Islamic threat remains the Pakistani military capabilities which may be augmented by arms transfers from other Muslim states in west Asia. To this may be added the internal ‘Islamic threat’ which stems from India’s increasing inability to manage Hindu-Muslim communal conflict within the country. The spread of vociferous Islamic fundamentalist politics from various parts of Muslim world to India’s 120 million Muslims constitutes rising transnational threat contributing to the potential instability of the Indian state.” Thomas (op cit) p 67 
71. Gupta (op cit) p 60 
72. Dibb (op cit) p 71 
73. Cited in William Chapin (1967) p 4 
74. Harvey Stockwin ‘ASEAN ministerial meeting begins today.’ The Times of India, New Delhi, July 16, 1996. 
75. Satu P Limaye ‘Indo-U.S security ties.’ The Hindu Feb 4, 1995 
76. Thomas (op cit) p 69 
77. See for example Dibb (op cit) p 34 
78. Gupta (op cit) pp 38,50,58, Heisbourg (1993) p 126, Thomas (op cit) p 71, Thomas(1993) p 3 
79. Dibb (op cit) p 34 
80. Heisbourg (op cit) p 126 
81. Ibid p 126 
82. Gupta (op cit) p 48 
83. Cohen (op cit) p 92 
84. The importance of this debate has to be seen in this background that already there is a visible change in India’s defence-spending priorities. With a rapid and consistent rise from 1985 to 1989 the defence spending was ‘slashed mercilessly’ in the following four years.’ The reasons were many. For example, budgetary constraints or Soviet-Union’s collapse, but the main reason seems to have been that of change in security perceptions. In the short and medium term the threats to Indian security are perceived to be internal. As to its wider/global role India wants to maintain a ‘suitable’ level of power projections. That is why the budgetary constraints did not affect the Indian missile program. See Gupta (op cit) pp 38 – 43 and also all the works cited in fn 78 above for threats to India’s ‘security’ being internal. 
85. This point has been discussed in some detail in Andrabi (1992). It has been argued that the Hindu elites eyed on Kashmir well before 1947 and they intended to turn Kashmir into a powerful weapon in their arsenal to undermine their regional rival Pakistan after 1947. See pp 30-37 
86. See for example Jones (1986) p 180 
87. ‘Mother India’ is Vivekanand’s term. Vivekananda is considered and portrayed in Indian history books as an enlightened thinker and his ‘greatness’ is mainly seen in his having been invited to 1893 Chicago parliament of Religions. In a ‘famous’ address at Lahore (now in Pakistan) in 1897 he said ‘For the next 50 years that alone should be our keynote, our Mother India. Let all other vain gods vanish for the time from our minds. This is the only God.’ cited in Dr Nitish Sengupta ‘A Century after Chicago.’ The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 14, 1993. Loyal to the heritage, a hundred years later the president of India Dr Shankar Dayal Sharma while speaking at a statue-unveiling ceremony of Vivekananda on August 1, 1993 in the western Indian city of Poona ‘appealed to the people to worship India as a God’. See Swapan Dasgupta ‘Divine Discomfort– Extricating The Soul from India’. The Times of India, August 4, 1993. 
88. Stephen Cohen (op cit) p 85 makes almost a similar point when he says that Pakistan is considered by most Indians as an unfortunate fact of life. With such a perception, Cohen very rightly argues that ‘India-Pakistan relations are quite unlike relations between most other states.’ 
89. See Jones (op cit) p 176 for an interesting argument that Indian mind for almost the first and half decade after independence remained so much preoccupied with the stability and integrity of India that even foreign policy was used to serve this purpose. The principles of non-alignment, self-reliance, democratic socialism etc. etc. were used basically with the view: to contain the internal Indian divisions and factors of ‘instability’. 
90. The present Indian government (United Front government) is first of its kind— a coalition of regional parties. This was made possible by Congress support and Bharitiya Janata Party’s (BJP) ‘silence’ (a gesture that they are not going to immediately dislodge it). It seems to me that putting this coalition into power is an exercise to relieve the pressures on Indian State that were building up for quite some time due to the political assertion of deprived sections, particularly Dalits. This arrangement will be ‘stabilising’ for Indian State for two reasons: one, the UF leaders with genuine concerns for their communities or regions will cultivate a ‘national’ outlook, according to which they like other ‘national leaders’ will consider the disappearance of Pakistan more important than the upliftment of their deprived fellow beings who they represented; second, it is an exercise in decentralisation—although more apparent than real— and this was long considered to be important for ‘solving the problems of internal security,’ as, for example, professor Thomas had suggested (see Thomas (1993a) p 81) 
91. For a very insightful description of such social changes as reflected in India’s 1996 General elections see C P Bhambri ‘National Government: Pancea or Deadlock?’ The Pioneer New Delhi June 7, 1996 
92. Gandhi repeatedly emphasised that for him independence meant ‘Ram Rajya’. 
See Ghandhi (1981) p 80. In fact Ghandhi had started the struggle for independence ‘to establish Ram Rajya’ Ghandhi (1971) p 72. Ghandhi went on saying that in modern times the first two Caliphs of Islam Abu Bakr and Umar also had successfully established Ram Rajya. Ghandhi (1967) p 558 
93. Gupta (op cit) pp 25,35-39 
94. Ibid p 63
95. Ibid p 63 
96. Nirmala George ‘India adopts proactive stance towards Pakistan’ The Indian Express New Delhi July 5, 1996 
97. Bhabani sen Gupta ‘A new Style, A new Substance’ The Hindustan Times July 15, 1996 
98. Nirmala George (op cit) 
99. Ibid . See also Shekhar Gupta ‘Prescriptions of a Hawk: How India can Win its Cold War.’ The Indian Express, August 1, 1996. Gupta shows an awareness of Pakistan’s fears that in the new market-democratic India ‘Pakistan can be treated as a distraction rather than the focus of its foreign policy.’ 
100. BBC Radio broadcast. September 9, 1996. Program ‘Connections’ 
101. Gupta (1995) p 62 
102. Sikkim lies in the north-east of India. It was under British control from 1861 to 1947 and then an Indian Protectorate and ultimately was made an Indian state from 1975. 
103. Gupta (op cit) p 57 
104. It is not that India has ignored the importance of Pakistan in the past with regards to the solution of Kashmir. It has always realised Pakistan’s key importance but all its efforts were directed at making Pakistan more and more irrelevant in the Kashmir dispute. 1971 dismantling of Pakistan, among other things, was an important practical step towards that end. 
105. For a fuller account of this point see Andrabi (1996) 
106. Mohammed Malick ‘U.S evolves plan for peace in S Asia’ The Indian Express New Delhi July 3, 1996 
107. U.S Ambassador to India Frank Wisner while talking to media persons in Islamabad on July 12, 1996 denied that Stephen Cohen’s was a U.S government plan. However he ‘admitted’ having ‘read’ Cohen’s proposals in newspapers. See The Daily Jang, London July 13, 1996 
108. Dibb (op cit) p 34

109. Cohen (op cit) p 34 
110. John Cherian (op cit) 
111. Bhabani sen Gupta ‘Kashmir–Room for Dialogue.’ 
The Hindustan Times Jan 27, 1994 
112. This is Bhabani sen Gupta’s comment who was himself present in the meeting as a participant from India. see Ibid 
113. For a detailed account of India’s rigidity in the early years of Kashmir tangle see Saifuddin Khaled (1994) 
114. See Syed M I Andrabi ‘Identifying Encroachments on Islam’ Part 3, 
Greater Kashmir, Srinagar July 17, 1994 
115. See M Rasgotra (op cit) and also Bhabani sen Gupta ‘Neighbours’ neighbours’ The Hindustan Times New Delhi June 24, 1993 


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Dr. Syed M Inayatullah Andrabi is a well-known figure in the circles of political Islam. Born in Srinagar, the capital city of Indian Held Kashmir, Dr Andrabi has been intimately involved at the intellectual level with the global politics and political issues since his student days in 1980 at Pune (India), where he completed his Ph.D. in Linguistics in 1983 at the Centre of Advanced Study in Linguistics, Deccan College, University of Pune, Pune, India. Upon completing his doctorate he returned home to join the University of Kashmir, first on a post-doctoral fellowship and later as faculty, but could not continue because of the deteriorating security situation in Kashmir, and had to move to United Kingdom in 1994 where he continues to live since along with his wife and five children.